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A note from the Editor 
 
 
Wide-ranging coverage 
This issue exemplifies the width of issues that can arise in 
animal protection law. 
The potential availability of various tax concessions to animal 
protection organizations is considered by Celeste Black 
Tara Ward highlights the inadequacies of the regulatory 
framework ostensibly in place to protect Australian wildlife after the 
killing of a captive population of more than 500 kangaroos on 
Department of Defence land in the Australian Capital Territory last year. 
Brett Salter explores the legal status of animals in Australia’s 
first colonial courts.  Alex Bruce considers the treatment of animals in 
Trade Practices Act cases and suggests radical improvement.  Expatriate 
Associate professor Amanda Whitfort reports on animal welfare laws in 
Hong Kong, as a useful comparison with some Australasian positions. 
And the Book Reviews section notes two important animal law 
publications published recently in Australia and New Zealand.  
 
In confidence 
In 2008, the Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 
(AAPLJ) became Australia’s first peer-reviewed journal devoted 
entirely to the law relating to animals.  It did so with the generous 
support of Voiceless, the fund for animals, and through the 
unremunerated labours of an elite group of anonymous peer reviewers.   
Rigorous peer reviewing of articles submitted for publication is 
essential to the authority of any serious law journal.  The question for 
this editor is whether the identity of the peers who are doing the 
assessing should be kept confidential or made public?   
The interests of a transparent and accountable process are pitted 
against the interests of candour that allow peer reviewers to make frank 
comments without fear of prejudicing their professional position in 
relation to the peers they are reviewing. 
A consultative review board has been suggested as a kind of 
quality assurance/accountability mechanism providing some recognition 
for those helping out in the process of establishing a journal to provide 
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“some much needed scrutiny of how the law currently fails to protect 
against animal abuse”. 1  
The editor of the AAPLJ invites and encourages further debate 
from readers on this most important aspect of its publication 
 
Financial support 
While gratefully acknowledging the generous contribution of 
Voiceless, the fund for animals, in 2008-09, the Australian Animal 
Protection Law Journal will frankly be reliant upon varying levels of 
financial support in these early years of becoming established as a 
dynamic forum for discussion of issues affecting the lives of non-human 
animals. 
Any person or organisation wishing to subscribe to the AAPLJ 
or become a Friend (and receive volumes for two years) or Patron (and 
receive volumes for as long as it continues to be economically viable) 
should contact the Editor through mancyj@gmail.com for further 
information.   
                                                
1Peter Sankoff, “Turn up the dialogue”, [2008] APPLJ 6. 
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Tax Concessions and Animal 
Protection Organisations: 
Benefits and Barriers 
 
Celeste M Black! 
 
I.  Introduction 
Much of the Federal Government’s support for non-profit 
groups in Australia takes the form of indirect assistance through tax 
concessions rather than direct support through funding.  These so-called 
“tax expenditures”, which result from the Government not taxing 
amounts which would otherwise be taxable, have been estimated by 
Treasury, with the most recent figures showing $950m in value for 
deductions for donations to charities and in the range of $100m - 
$1,000m in value for the tax exemptions available to charitable entities.2   
Like other types of non-profit groups, animal protection organisations 
may be entitled to the benefits of these concessions if the technical 
eligibility requirements are met.  That said, the barriers to obtaining 
endorsement for these concessions must also be appreciated.  This paper 
will analyse the various tax concessions provided in the legislation 
which may be relevant for animal protection organisations and highlight 
the limitations on access to these concessions, both those explicit in the 
legislation and those which arise from the manner in which the 
concession system is administered.   
This paper focuses on two particular endorsement processes: 
endorsement as a tax concession charity and endorsement as a 
deductible gift recipient.  A tax concession charity is not only entitled to 
an income tax exemption but may be also entitled to a Fringe Benefits 
Tax (FBT) exemption or rebate and Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
concessions.  The potential value of these concessions comes from the 
                                                
! Celeste M Black is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney.  
Any opinions expressed herein are entirely the author’s own. 
2 Treasury, Tax Expenditures Statement 2007, available at: 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=&ContentID=1333.  Category 
A66 covers tax deductible gifts and for 2008/09 the estimate of tax forgone is 
$950m.  The value of the tax exemption for charities (category B22) is significantly 
more difficult to estimate given the limitations on available data but Treasury puts it 
in the range of $100m to $1,000m for 2008/09.   
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effective reduction in operating costs which flow from the concessions.  
On the other hand, endorsement as a deductible gift recipient (DGR) has 
the potential to both increase the flow of donations and legitimise the 
activities of the organisation in the eyes of the public.   
II.  Tax concession charities 
A.  Benefits of endorsement 
Various tax concessions are made available to charitable organisations 
and funds which meet particular criteria.  A non-profit organisation, 
such as an animal protection organisation, which meets the criteria of a 
“charitable institution” or which has set up a “charitable fund” may be 
entitled to the following concessions: 
• Income tax exemption; 
• FBT exemption or rebate; and 
• GST charity concessions.   
 
The income tax exemption 
Pursuant to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (hereinafter the Tax 
Act) certain non-profit entities are exempt from income tax with respect 
to their income which might otherwise be assessable.3  The legislation 
provides a list of eligible entity types which includes charitable 
institutions and funds established in Australia for public charitable 
purposes by will or instrument of trust.4  To qualify for the exemption, 
an institution must also meet certain requirements as to its connections 
with Australia, physical presence and activities, referred to as the 
“physical presence in Australia test.  ”.5  Importantly, the Tax Act 
requires that for both types of the entities, they must be endorsed by the 
Commissioner of Taxation. 6   
                                                
3 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (hereinafter “ITAA 1997”) s 50-1 “The total 
*ordinary income and *statutory income of the entities covered by the following 
tables is exempt from income tax.  In some cases, the exemption is subject to special 
conditions.”  The Australian Taxation Office has issued a guide to assist non-profit 
groups in interpreting the application of these various exemptions.  See ATO, 
Income tax guide for non-profit organisations (NAT 7967) (2007) available on the 
ATO website at: http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/Nat7967_3_2007.pdf 
4 ITAA 1997 s 50-5, items 1.1 and 1.5B.  There is an additional category of tax exempt 
funds called “income tax exempt funds” which includes funds established by will or 
instrument of trust which are not charitable but which are established solely to 
distribute funds to deductible gift recipients.  ITAA 1997 s 50-20. 
5 ITAA 1997 s 50-50.  See also ATO, Gift Pack, Guide for deductible gift recipients and 
donors (NAT 3132) (2007) pp 28-29. 
6 ITAA 1997 s 50-52 (charitable institutions and funds).  The general requirements for 
endorsement are provided in ITAA97 ss50-105 and 50-110.  The Commissioner is 
required to endorse an entity as exempt if the entity is entitled to the endorsement 
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Critical to the endorsement process is the requirement that the entity be 
established for charitable purposes and it is through the interpretation of 
the term “charitable” that the various endorsement criteria have 
developed.  The income tax exemption applies to all income derived by 
the endorsed entity, even where the entity carries on commercial 
activities.  The extent to which an entity may carry on such commercial 
activities and still be entitled to endorsement as a tax-exempt charity is 
the subject of the currently pending Word Investment case.7  In that case, 
the Commissioner of Taxation has maintained that a charitable 
institution may only carry on commercial activities which are incidental 
or ancillary to its charitable activities.  This can be contrasted to the 
situation where, in addition to charitable activities, an independent 
commercial activity is carried on by the entity but for the purpose of 
applying any profits derived from the activity solely to charitable ends.   
FBT exemption or rebate 
Another potential concession for charitable organisations lies within the 
Fringe Benefits Tax (“FBT”) regime.8  In contrast to the income tax, the 
FBT is a tax imposed on employers with respect to benefits provided to 
employees, where the tax acts effectively as a proxy for the income tax 
that would otherwise have been payable by the employees.  9  Income 
tax is not payable by the recipient employee with respect to fringe 
benefits received.  Status as an income tax exempt charity does not 
prevent the application of the FBT.  Instead, there are two potential 
concessions which may reduce the impact of the FBT, the FBT 
exemption and the FBT rebate.  The FBT exemption allows benefits 
provided to employees to be exempt from FBT up to a cap10 and is only 
available to a limited number of types of entities.11  An animal 
protection organisation is unlikely to be eligible for this exemption.   
                                                                                                        
and has followed the procedure specified in Division 426 in Schedule 1 to the 
Taxation Administration Act 1953.  For these purposes, the Australian Taxation 
Office has created an “Application for endorsement as a tax concession charity or 
income tax exempt fund”, NAT 10651. 
7 Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Limited [2007] FCAFC 171.  The 
Commissioner’s appeal of this case to the High Court was heard on 27 August 2008 
but the Court has not yet released its judgment. 
8 The fringe benefits tax is imposed by the Fringe Benefits Tax Act 1986 (Cth) and the 
calculation and administration of the tax is provided for by the Fringe Benefits Tax 
Assessment Act 1986 (Cth) (hereinafter FBTAA). 
9 Prior to the introduction of the FBT, the value of these benefits was taxed as 
employment income derived by the employee.  See the former s 26(e) of the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). 
10 This cap can be either $30,000 or $17,000 per employee per FBT year, depending on 
the type of exempt entity. 
11 The types of eligible entities are pubic benevolent institutions, health promotion 
charities, public and non-profit hospitals and public ambulance services. 
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The FBT rebate is available to those organisations of a type listed in the 
legislation where this list specifically includes endorsed charitable 
institutions.12  The FBT rebate operates to provide a rebate equal to 48% 
of the gross FBT which would otherwise be payable, subject to a cap. 13  
This rebate is said to compensate tax exempt employers for the fact that 
they are unable to claim a deduction for the FBT paid to which tax-
paying employers are otherwise entitled.  The effect of this concession 
is that, up to the specified level, fringe benefits may be provided to 
employees of charities with significantly reduced levels of FBT. 14   
GST concessions 
The Goods and Services Tax (“GST”) regime also provides a range of 
concessions for charities.  For example, there is a higher turnover 
threshold before GST registration is required, special treatment exists 
for fundraising activities, gifts to the charity are not subject to GST and 
a charity’s non-commercial activities are GST-free. 15  Once again, to 
claim the concessions, a charity must be endorsed by the Commissioner 
as a charitable institution or a charitable fund. 16 
                                                
12 An extensive list of eligible types of employers is provided at FBTAA s 65J.  It seems 
likely that an animal protection organisation would only qualify under the 
“charitable institution” category of sub-s (baa).  The endorsement process is 
specified in FBTAA s 123E(1) which links back to the same endorsement process 
prescribed by the Taxation Administration Act which is used for endorsement for the 
income tax exemption.  It may be of interest to note that the rebatable employer list 
includes non-profit societies, associations and clubs which encourage or promote 
animal races (para (i)) and those which promote the development of agricultural and 
pastoral resources (para (l)). 
13 FBTAA s 65J(2A).  The cap is set at $30,000 per employee of grossed-up value of 
fringe benefits.  The gross-up mechanism within the FBT is complex but operates to 
ultimately produce an amount of FBT which, in after-tax cost measures, would be 
equivalent to the income tax which would have applied had the benefits been 
provided in cash.  The gross-up figures are based on the GST rate (10%) and the top 
marginal personal income tax rate (currently 46.5%) such that the gross-up figure is 
2.0647 for GST-inclusive benefits. 
14 By way of example, a charity may be considering paying an employee an additional 
$8333 in salary which, after taking away the income tax which would be due 
(assume at 40%) would leave the employee with $5000 in hand.  In comparison, the 
charity could provide fringe benefits worth $5000 to this employee.  The employee 
is indifferent as between the form of the remuneration.  The charity would otherwise 
be required to pay $4346 of FBT with respect to this benefit but, if entitled to the 
rebate, the amount of FBT due is reduced to $2260.  Therefore the total cost to the 
charity is $7260 (cost of the fringe benefit plus the FBT) as compared to the cost of 
the extra salary of $8333. 
15 The various concessions are located throughout the A New Tax System (Goods and 
Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth).  These concessions are described in ATO, Tax basics 
for non-profit organisations (NAT 7966) (2007) ch 3. 
16 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth), Div 176.  This 
endorsement process is again that established under the Taxation Administration Act. 
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B.  Qualifying as a charity 
 
What is a charitable purpose? 
Endorsement as either a charitable institution or a charitable fund will 
focus primarily on this test: the entity must be established and 
maintained for a charitable purpose.  This section of the paper will 
consider those issues which arise from the meaning of “charitable 
purpose” which are particularly relevant to animal protection 
organisations.  In the case of entities seeking endorsement as a 
“charitable institution” there may also be an issue as to whether the 
entity qualifies as an “institution”.  Several cases have addressed this 
issue but it is considered to be outside the scope of this paper to analyse 
it in detail.17  However, one important issue which is raised is the 
distinction between an early stage organisation, operating on a small 
scale by a group of family members and/or friends, and a later stage 
organisation with a greater degree of permanence and identity beyond 
that of the founders, where only the latter stage may be considered an 
institution. 18 
The term “charity” has developed a detailed technical meaning which 
goes back to the Statute of Elizabeth19 and the opinion of Lord 
Macnaghten in Pemsel’s case. 20 The Statute of Elizabeth lists various 
charitable objects and this has been interpreted to include those 
purposes which are beneficial to the community and are within the 
“spirit and intendment” of the Statute of Elizabeth.  Lord Macnaghten 
listed four principal divisions of charities, being the relief of poverty, 
advancement of education, the advancement of religion and “other” 
purposes beneficial to the community. 21  It is this “other purposes 
beneficial to the community” category into which an animal protection 
organisation must obviously fall.   
                                                
17 See, for example, Pamas Foundation Inc v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
(1992) 23 ATR 189, 92 ATC 4161, and Christian Enterprises Ltd v Commissioner of 
Land Tax (NSW) (1968) 88 WN (Part 2) (NSW) 112. 
18 See also Taxation Ruling TR 2005/21 “Income tax and fringe benefits tax: charities” 
para 150. 
19 Statute of Charitable Uses Act 1601 (UK) [43 Eliz I c 4]. 
20 Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 at 583. 
21 This approach to defining the meaning of “charitable institution” or “charitable 
object” has been adopted by the Australian courts.  For example, see the recent 
confirmation of this meaning by the High Court in Central Bayside General Practice 
Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2006] HCA 43 (31 August 
2006) and the application of these tests in Commissioner of Taxation v Word 
Investments Ltd [2007] FCAFC 171 (14 November 2007) and Victorian Women 
Lawyers’ Association Inc v Commr of Taxation [2008] FCA 983 (27 June 2008).  
These same tests have been adopted in the ATO’s tax ruling.  See TR 2005/21 para 
8-12. 
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Many purposes in addition to those specifically listed in Pemsel’s case 
have been accepted by the courts in Australia and the Australian 
Taxation Office (the “ATO”) as being charitable, including protecting 
animals.  However, what is interesting is that this is based on the 
implicit link between animal protection and benefits to the human 
community, rather than on the view that protecting animals for the 
benefit of the animals themselves can be charitable.  This link can find 
its source in the following statement which was adopted by the House 
of Lords where the issue was whether a gift to protect animals was 
charitable:  
"A gift for the benefit and protection of animals tends to promote and 
encourage kindness towards them, to discourage cruelty, and to 
ameliorate the condition of the brute creation, and thus to stimulate 
humane and generous sentiments in man towards the lower animals, and 
by these means promote feelings of humanity and morality generally, 
repress brutality, and thus elevate the human race.  ".22 
Even more explicitly, Australian courts have held that “a gift for the 
benefit of animals is not charitable per se”23 where such a gift may be 
charitable only where benefits to the (human) community can also be 
shown.  This standard is also reflected in recent ATO publications where 
the following statements are made:  “Non-profit organisations that 
operate for the public benefit to protect, care for, preserve, or study 
animals, or improve the community’s moral feelings towards them, are 
charities”24 and “The purpose must be to help animals that are useful to 
the community or promote humane feelings in people by either caring 
for or preventing cruelty towards animals.  ”.25  However, that said, it is 
now generally accepted that animal protection and animal welfare are 
charitable purposes and this is reflected in the ATO’s endorsement 
application which includes animals as an option for the entity’s area of 
main activities and should give an animal protection organisation some 
confidence that its activities would be considered charitable.   
Political purposes? 
It is important to note that political or lobbying purposes are not 
                                                
22 This statement is taken the from the case In re Wedgwood (1915) 1 Ch 113 (Swinfen 
Eady LJ) and was quoted in the judgments delivered by Viscount Simon, Lord 
Simonds and Lord Normand in the House of Lords case National Anti-Vivisection 
Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1948) AC 31.  Quoted with approval in 
Attorney-General (SA) v Bray [1964] HCA 3 by Kitto J. 
23 Murdoch v The Attorney-General (1992) 1 Tas R 117, 131  per Zeeman J.  Quoted 
with approval in Perpetual Trustees Ltd v State of Tasmania [2000] TASSC 68 by 
Slicer J. 
24 ATO, Income Tax Guide for Non-profit Organisations (NAT 7967) p 38. 
25 TR 2005/21 para 218. 
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considered to be charitable purposes. 26  This view can be traced back to 
the dictum of Lord Parker in Bowman v Secular Society where he stated, 
in essence, that a political purpose cannot be charitable as the court has 
no way of determining whether the proposed change to the law will 
benefit society.  27  However, the existence of a non-charitable purpose 
will not prevent the organisation from being considered to be charitable 
provided that the non-charitable purpose is merely ancillary or 
incidental to the primary, charitable purpose. 28 
As the activities of an animal protection organisation may include 
activities which could be described as political or lobbying activities, it 
must be considered in each case whether such activities are merely 
ancillary or incidental to its main purposes.  For example, in one case 
where an Australian court considered whether an anti-vivisection 
society and the RSPCA were charities for the purposes of determining 
the validity of a bequest, the court concluded that the anti-vivisection 
society was not a charity since its main object was to change existing 
law to prohibit vivisection and this did not fall within any head of 
“charity” whether or not the activities were seen as primarily political.29  
In contrast, the RSPCA was accepted as a charity even though one of its 
objects was to procure legislation as this activity would further its main 
object of preventing cruelty to animals where this object was held to be 
charitable due to its influence on “human sentiment and conduct.”30   
The extent to which an organisation may be involved in activities 
which could be characterised as “political” whilst still retaining 
their status as a charity has been recently tested in a number of 
                                                
26 TR 2005/21 para 18. 
27 Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 at 442: “A trust for the attainment of 
political objects has always been held invalid, … because the Court has no means of 
judging whether or not a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the 
public benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a 
charitable gift.” Per Lord Parker.  Cited recently in Victorian Women Lawyers’ 
Association at para 127. 
28 TR 2005/21 para 27.  See also para 103 which provides the following: “if the purpose 
of an institution or fund is charitable, the presence of political or lobbying programs 
and activities will not detract from this status, provided they are merely incidental to 
the charitable purpose.” 
29 Re Inman (deceased) [1965] VR 238 at 244.  See also National Anti-Vivisection 
Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1947] 2 All ER 217 where the court 
suggests that the abolition of vivisection would actually be detrimental to society. 
30 Re Inman (deceased) [1965] VR 238 at 242.  As a potential indication of the types of 
activities, on balance, acceptable to the Commissioner, it should be noted that the 
following entities currently are endorsed as charitable institutions:  RSPCA 
Australia Inc, Animals Australia Inc, Humane Society International Inc and Animal 
Welfare League NSW. 
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cases.31  In the Aid/Watch case, which is currently on appeal to the 
Full Federal Court, the view was taken that Aid/Watch, an 
organisation which does not itself deliver overseas aid but rather 
monitors and reports on the process, was not disqualified from 
being a charity as its activities to influence government policy 
with respect to the nature, extent and means of delivery of aid 
were not contrary to the general government policy in favour of 
aid.  32  However, the following was also stated: “[i]t may be 
disqualified if its objects and activities, although not overtly 
political, still place undue emphasis on attempts to influence 
government, particularly with respect to priorities and methods.  
The argument against charitable status may be enhanced because 
of its activist approaches and confrontational methods.  ”.33  The 
opinion of the Federal Court on the relevance of this distinction 
should give organisations clearer guidance as to the nature of and 
the extent to which political activities may be undertaken whilst 
still meeting the charitable purpose test.   
 
III.  Deductible gift recipients 
 
A.  DGR endorsement 
Under another division of the Tax Act, certain organisations may 
receive tax deductible gifts.34  These organisations, referred to as 
Deductible Gift Recipients (or “DGRs”), fall into one of two groups:  
those endorsed by the ATO and those specifically named in the Tax Act.  
According to recent statistics, 99% of charities obtained DGR status 
through ATO endorsement. 35 
To be endorsed by the ATO, the organisation must fall within the 
description of one of the general categories listed in the Tax Act, meet 
certain other requirements under the tax law (such as a relevant 
connection with Australia) and apply for endorsement.36  As will be seen 
by the discussion below, it is significantly more difficult for most 
animal protection organisations to obtain DGR status than the tax 
                                                
31 See for example, Victorian Women Lawyers’ Association Inc v Commr of Taxation 
[2008] FCA 983 (27 June 2008) and Aid/Watch Incorporated and Commissioner of 
Taxation [2008] AATA 652 (28 July 2008) (currently being appealed by the 
Commissioner to the Full Federal Court). 
32 Aid/Watch, above note 30, at para 47. 
33 Aid/Watch, above note 30, at para 49. 
34 ITAA 1997, Division 30. 
35 ATO, Taxation Statistics 2005/06, p 98.  The total number of DGRs by the year’s end 
was 24,384.  Of that, only 165 were specifically listed. 
36 The relevant form from the ATO is “Application for endorsement as a deductible gift 
recipient” (NAT 2948). 
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exemption, unless they provide direct care to animals or focus on 
wildlife.   
Alternatively, a DGR may be listed by name in the Tax Act, where such 
a listing requires an amendment to the Tax Act to be passed by 
Parliament.  Listed DGRs are included in the Tax Act by being added to 
the tables which accompany the general descriptions.  As one might 
imagine, this is inherently a highly political process and one for which 
no guidelines have been provided.  Each listing is decided on a case by 
case basis.   
 
B.  Endorsement by the ATO 
The process by which an organisation may seek endorsement as a DGR 
is described in various ATO publications.37  As a preliminary matter, the 
organisation must fall within one of the DGR general categories as 
described in the Tax Act.  The Tax Act may also, in some instances, 
provide additional criteria which must be met by organisations seeking 
endorsement in one of the general categories of DGRs.   
Difficulties may arise where the activities of an organisation would 
appear to fall within the description of more than one category.  
Whether activities outside of the ‘qualifying’ activities are allowed will 
vary from one category to another.  In such a case, it may be more 
appropriate to establish a separate fund which can receive donations 
with respect to that ‘qualifying’ activity only.  By way of example, in 
the case of Healthy Cities Illawarra, the charitable organisation was 
seeking to be endorsed in the health category.38  Although its various 
activities were beneficial to the community generally, the organisation 
could not show that the principal activity was disease prevention and 
therefore did not succeed in objecting to the ATO’s decision that it was 
not entitled to endorsement.  In the case of an animal protection 
organisation, a number of categories could be considered.   
 
Welfare and Rights – Direct care 
The most obvious category which an animal protection organisation 
could potentially fit within is the “welfare and rights” category.39  
Recent amendments to the general categories table inserted a reference 
                                                
37 For example, see the ATO guide GiftPack, above note 4. 
38 Healthy Cities Illawarra Inc and Commissioner of Taxation [2006] AATA 522.  The 
significant issue addressed in the decision was whether disease prevention included 
injury prevention, where it was concluded that it did not.  Therefore, given the wide 
range of activities undertaken by the organisation, it was more difficult to argue a 
principal activity of disease prevention. 
39 ITAA 1997 s 30-45. 
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to animal welfare groups but that extension is rather strictly drawn and 
only applies where the principal activity of the charitable institution 
involves the direct care and/or rehabilitation of animals (but not only 
native wildlife).40  (Those organisations which care for only native 
wildlife may seek endorsement under the environment category.)  The 
listing requires that the institution’s principal activity is providing short-
term direct care to animals that have been lost or mistreated or are 
without owners and/or rehabilitating orphaned, sick or injured animals 
that have been lost or mistreated or are without owners.   
When these amendments were originally proposed in 2005, Voiceless (a 
non-profit fund for animals) prepared a detailed submission, suggesting 
that, though the proposals were a step in the right direction, they were 
unduly restrictive.41  These concerns would appear to have been well 
founded given interpretation of these requirements by the ATO.42  For 
example, in the view of the ATO, to be mistreated it is not sufficient that 
the animal is suffering from illness or injury – the illness or injury must 
have resulted from the mistreatment.  This does not seem to take into 
account that failure to seek veterinary care for illness or injury could 
itself be a case of mistreatment.  Another example is the emphasis on 
the concession only being made available for short-term care.  For 
example, the view is taken by the ATO that ongoing care for animals 
which have been rehabilitated or who have recovered from illness or 
injury will not qualify, only the care given during the rehabilitation 
phase qualifies.  One might query the practicality (not to mention the 
necessity from a policy perspective) of applying such a distinction.   
An alternative which has been tested is the characterisation of an animal 
welfare organisation as a public benevolent institution (“PBI”) where 
classification as a PBI would also qualify an organisation for the 
welfare and rights list.  In FCT v RSPCA Qld Inc, the Court of Appeal 
(Queensland) considered whether the RSPCA should be considered a 
PBI.43  The majority concluded that the RSPCA was not a PBI.  Even 
were it accepted that the activities of the RSPCA were ultimately 
directed at or indirectly benefitted human beings and therefore the 
public, the RSPCA would not be a PBI as it did not provide relief for 
the needy or underprivileged (the traditional tests for PBI status).44  It 
                                                
40 Item 4.1.6 of ITAA 1997 s 30-45(1).  See GiftPack, above note 4, pp 39-41 for the 
ATO’s interpretation of the standards dictated by this sub-category. 
41 Voiceless, Deductible Gift Recipients & Animal Protection Organisations – A 
Submission by Voiceless for Amendments to the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 
(28 November 2005). 
42 See GiftPack, above note 4, pp 39-41. 
43 FCT v RSPCA Qld Inc (1992) 23 ATR 582, 92 ATC 4441. 
44 FCT v RSPCA Qld Inc (1992) 23 ATR at 592.  See also Taxation Ruling TR 2003/5 
especially para 38.  The traditional test requires that that the organisation seek to 
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should be noted however that the various RSPCA groups within 
Australia, including that of Queensland, are now specifically listed in 
the Tax Act under welfare and rights.   
The Environment 
An alternative category which an animal protection organisation may 
consider is the Environment.45  The general category of recipients are 
public funds established and maintained by environmental organisations 
which are on the Register of Environmental Organisations maintained 
by the Environment Secretary.  The principal purpose of the 
organisation must be the protection or enhancement of the natural 
environment or a significant aspect of the natural environment or the 
provision of information or education or the carrying on of research in 
relation thereto. 46  
The Register of Environmental Organisations is administered by the 
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (the 
“Department”) in consultation with the Tax Office.  The Department has 
issued guidelines (release date of 2003) for organisations seeking entry 
onto the Register.47  In section 2, the Guidelines provide the 
Department’s interpretation of the requisite principal purpose of the 
organisation.  It is emphasised that the environmental purpose must be 
the principal purpose of the organisation.  It also concludes that the use 
of the term “natural environment” is to distinguish the natural 
environment from built, cultural or historic environments, thereby 
including wildlife but excluding zoos. 48   
Although there may be arguments that the term “environment” should 
be broadly interpreted to include all animals,49 it appears that it is the 
view of the Department that the additional inclusion of the term 
“natural” in the Tax Act restricts the meaning to only wildlife, rather 
than animals generally.  As a result, it would seem difficult for an 
animal protection organisation to be included on the Register unless its 
activities principally relate to wild animals.   
 
Other DGR Categories 
There are various other DGR categories which could be considered by 
                                                                                                        
relieve poverty, sickness, suffering, distress, misfortune, disability or helplessness. 
45 ITAA 1997 s 30-55. 
46 ITAA 1997 s 30-265. 
47 See http://www.environment.gov.au/tax/reo/guidelines/pubs/reo-guide-2007.pdf 
48 Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Register of 
Environmental Organisation Guidelines (2003) at p 9. 
49 See the comments of Gray ACJ in Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v 
Hahnheuser [2007] FCA 1535, para 64. 
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an animal protection organisation where the ability to meet the criteria 
of the category will turn on the specific activities of the organisation.  
However, in most cases, the DGR category is fairly strictly defined and 
it may be difficult to characterise the activities of the organisation in the 
requisite way.  For example, although some animal protection 
organisations undertake community education activities, the education 
category50 requires that an education recipient be a specified type of 
educational institution (such as a public university) or a public fund set 
up for a particular, listed purpose, such as providing religious education 
in government schools.  Education regarding animal welfare issues does 
not appear to fit within the listed general categories.   
C.  Specific Listing 
The other avenue by which an organisation may obtain DGR status is 
through specific listing in the Tax Act.  There are two types of entities 
which may be listed: prescribed private funds and others.  Prescribed 
private funds are listed by name in Schedule 3 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Regulations 1997.  As a general matter, the fund must be 
established under a will or instrument of trust and must be operated 
solely for providing benefits to other DGRs.  Foundations are added to 
this list through the government gazette.   
Other DGRs listed by name are incorporated into the schedules of the 
Tax Act through legislative amendment which must be approved by 
Parliament.  Details of the process or requirements for listing are not 
provided in any ATO publications.51  Each specifically listed DGR must 
fit within a category with the exception of the “other” category which 
presumably picks up those organisations which do not otherwise fit 
neatly within one of the more specified categories.  The amendments 
will often be part of a larger Bill that includes various amendments to 
the Tax Act and the new DGRs as a schedule to the Bill. 52 
IV.  Conclusions 
While a number of tax concessions are potentially available to animal 
protections organisations, and these tax concessions can be of 
significant value, the endorsement criteria which have developed and 
are applied by the Courts and the ATO may act as a barrier to many 
organisations.  Although animal welfare and protection is now generally 
accepted as a charitable purpose, an organisation seeking tax exempt 
                                                
50 ITAA 1997 s 30-25. 
51 Neither the Giftpack nor NAT 8443 (the relevant ATO factsheet) provide any 
guidance on these matters. 
52 See, eg, Schedule 9 to Act No 164 of 1997 (Tax Law Amendment (2007 Measures No 
5) Act 2007). 
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status may be denied that status if it is significantly engaged in political 
activities.  Of potentially greater value is DGR status due to its potential 
to enhance the flow of funds into an organisation.  However, as shown 
above, endorsement as a DGR is far more restricted and would 
generally only be available to organisations providing direct care to 
animals and those concerned with wildlife conservation.  Although 
specific listing is also an option, it is suggested that this avenue is a 
difficult one due to its highly political and public nature.   
_____________________
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Fences, Boundaries, and 
Jurisdictions: Canberra’s 
kangaroo ‘cull’ and the law
1
 
 
Tara Ward * 
 
In Australia, populations of wild kangaroos sometimes find 
themselves trapped behind various types of fences.  These captive 
populations can live within the enclosed area for many years.  Often, 
however, the consequences for the kangaroos are tragic, as was the case 
in 2008 when the Department of Defence ordered that a captive 
population of several hundred Eastern Grey Kangaroos on its land in the 
Australian Capital Territory be ‘culled’.  Despite kangaroos having 
suffered such a fate on Defence land before,2 and notwithstanding that 
millions of kangaroos are shot each year for commercial purposes 
alone,3 the killing of the 514 kangaroos on this particular tract of 
Defence land created a storm of protest locally and internationally. 4  It 
also laid bare the inadequacies of the regulatory framework that is 
ostensibly in place to protect our wildlife.   
This paper examines the controversial killing of the Canberra kangaroos 
and the particular legal and jurisdictional issues raised by Defence’s 
attempts to deal with kangaroos trapped on land situated within an 
Australian Territory.  It suggests that although the Department of 
Defence had advocated a non-lethal solution to the ‘problem’ of the 
enclosed kangaroo population in Canberra, the complexities of the legal 
‘protection’ framework may have made a lethal solution inevitable.  It  
                                                
! Adjunct lecturer in animal law, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales.  Any opinions expressed herein are 
entirely the author’s own. 
1 I would like to thank Catherine Ford for her invaluable help with the research for this paper. 
2 See ‘Wallaby cull at NT Air Force base’ AM – 29 March 2008, ABC:  www.abc.net.au/am/content/2008/s2202517.htm; and 
Department of Defence, ‘Interim Kangaroo Cull at Puckapunyal Ends’ Media Release, 4 July 2002, MSPA331/02: 
www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=1675. 
3 2,986,470 kangaroos were killed under the commercial harvest quota for 2007 according to the Department of the Environment, 
Water, Heritage and the Arts website: www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/trade-use/wild-harvest/kangaroo/quota/2007.html  
[3 December 2008]. 
4 See for example Squires, N, ‘Kangaroo cull starts despite Paul McCartney protest’ Telegraph.co.uk 19 May 2008 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1987821/Kangaroo-cull-starts-despite-Paul-McCartney-protest.html; and Markson, S, ‘Japan’s 
outrage at kangaroo cull,’ The Daily Telegraph, 16 March 2008: www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,23384169-401,00.html.  
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also echoes many calls for an improvement in the way we treat our 
national icon, especially when it is enclosed behind fences.  5 
 
Background  
 
While the actual ‘removal’ of the Canberra kangaroos was completed in 
less than two weeks, the events that led to their removal began several 
years earlier.  It is necessary to piece together those events to understand 
what happened and when, and also to illustrate why it can be so difficult 
to protect wildlife in Australia.   
As can be seen from the timeline below, ‘managing’ five to six hundred 
kangaroos behind fences on 115 hectares of Defence land in the middle 
of suburban Canberra demanded cooperation between three separate 
governments, and potentially involved at least five different types of 
wildlife licences regulated by two statutes in two separate jurisdictions.   
 
Timeline of the case of the Canberra kangaroos  
 
13 May 2007: The media reports plans by the Department of Defence 
(Defence) to cull approximately 400 kangaroos enclosed behind 
fences on a site known as the Belconnen Naval Transmission 
Station (BNTS) in the Australian Capital Territory (the ACT). 6 
31 May 2007: Wildcare, a non-profit wildlife organisation registered 
in NSW and based in Queanbeyan (on the border with the 
ACT), meets with Defence and the ACT Government to 
promote consideration of an alternative non-lethal plan for the 
management of the BNTS kangaroo population. 7  
20 June 2007: The Conservator of Flora and Fauna in the ACT 
approves licences for Defence to dart and euthanize the BNTS 
kangaroos.  8  
21 June 2007: The CEO of RSPCA (ACT) publicly calls for the 
kangaroos to be culled before the end of July 2007. 9  
                                                
5 See ‘Kangaroos again the losers in Canberra,’ Animals Australia, 20 May 2008: 
www.animalsaustralia.org/media/press_releases.php?release=99. 
6 Watts, B ‘Plan for three days of death’ Canberra Times, 13 May 2007: www.canberratimes.com.au/news/local/news/general/plan-
for-three-days-of-death/236657.aspx?storypage=0. 
7 Wildcare ‘Wildcare developing non-lethal plan for Defence kangaroos’ 31 May 2007: 
www.wildcare.com.au/media/WildcareMedia_31May07.doc. 
8  Territory and Municipal Services ACT (TAMS) ‘Issuing of Kangaroo Culling License’ MR145/0607, 20 June 2007: 
www.tams.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/60222/Issuing_of_Kangaroo_Culling_License.pdf. 
9 SSAA Media Monitoring, ABC 666 Canberra, Breakfast, 21/06/2007 8:36am: 
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5 July 2007: Defence defers any decision to cull the BNTS 
kangaroos. 
10
 
August 2007: Defence convenes an independent expert panel to 
assess the environmental impact of the kangaroo population at 
BNTS.  The panel’s key recommendations include ‘reduc[ing] 
the population by 400’ by translocating ‘as many as possible’.
11   
28 September 2007: Defence tenders for a specialist contractor to 
implement the panel’s recommendations. 
12  
15 November 2007: The Chief Minister of the ACT directs the ACT 
Commissioner for Sustainability and the Environment to 
investigate the native grasslands on the BNTS site.  The 
Commissioner convenes an expert panel. 
13   
20 December 2007: The kangaroo population on the BNTS site is 
reported as approximately 588. 
14 
Early 2008: Defence contracts an environmental consultancy firm to 
carry out a management program in relation to the kangaroos on 
the BNTS site, including translocation, darting and euthanizing 
if required, and fertility control.
15
  
26 February 2008: In the report to the ACT Government by the 
Commissioner for Sustainability and the Environment, the 
expert panel recommends the kangaroos on the site be 
euthanized by lethal injection.16 
27 February 2008: Defence announces that ACT Government 
policy does not allow ‘exporting’ Eastern Grey Kangaroos and 
that therefore an application to translocate the BNTS kangaroos 
would not be approved.  The Department’s contractor is 
directed to stop work on translocation applications and to start 
preparing for a cull. 17  
                                                                                                        
www.ssaa.org.au/newssaa/mediamonitor/june07/210607abc666canberra0836.html. 
10 Wildcare ‘ Wildcare presents a non-lethal alternative proposal for kangaroos on Defence properties’ 6 July 2007: 
www.wildcare.com.au/media/WildcareMedia_06Jul07.pdf. 
11 Department of Defence ‘Kangaroo Management at Defence Sites in the ACT’ CPA 341/07, 28 September 2007: 
www.defence.gov.au/media/2007/ACFE84.DOC. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Cooper, M (2008i), Report on Belconnen Naval Transmission Station (BNTS) Site as part of the Investigations into ACT 
Lowlands Grasslands Office of the Commissioner for Sustainability and the Environment ACT, 26 February 2008.  
14 Ibid, p10. 
15 Wildcare ‘Wildcare perspective on the BNTS kangaroo debate’ Media Release 28 March 2008 
www.wildcare.com.au/mediareleases.html; Department of Defence ‘Kangaroo cull at Belconnen’ MSPA 145/08, 23 May 
2008: www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=7763  
16 Cooper, M (2008i), op.cit, Attachment G, Panel Recommendation 3. 
17  Department of Defence ‘Defence Proposes Trial Kangaroo Management Program’ MSPA 80/08, 31 March 2008: 
www.defence.gov.au/media/departmentaltpl.cfm?CurrentId=7548 . 
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26 March 2008: The NSW Department of Environment and Climate 
Change states it would be prepared to consider a proposal to 
translocate the kangaroos. 
18  
31 March 2008: Defence announces it has requested approval from the 
ACT Government to undertake a scientific trial including trans-
location; the cull is officially put on hold. 
19  
11 April 2008: The Defence Minister orders the Department to start 
negotiations with the ACT Government over export licences 
needed to relocate the kangaroos. 20  
16 May 2008: Defence abandons plans for a scientific trial of trans-
location, and announces the cull is back on.  The process to kill 
‘about 400’ kangaroos begins almost immediately, with fences 
erected on the site that evening to channel the animals towards 
the killing pens. 21  
20 May 2008: The cull is in full swing.  Defence establishes a public 
information line for members of the public seeking information 
about the ‘management of kangaroos’ at the BNTS site. 22  
2 June 2008: The ‘cull’ finishes after 514 kangaroos have been 
darted with tranquillisers then euthanized by an injection of 
sodium pentobarbitone.  Carcases are removed and disposed of 
at another Defence site nearby. 23  A small number of kangaroos 
are kept alive as part of a kangaroo fertility research project 
which has used kangaroos on the BNTS site since 2005. 24 
 
Ultimately what unfolded at the BNTS site was not a ‘cull’ in its 
specific scientific meaning of a selective killing of inferior, aged, or 
diseased animals. 
25  As almost all the kangaroos were killed, the term 
‘kill’ will henceforth be used to refer to the removal of the kangaroos 
from the BNTS site in May 2008.  This term represents the most 
accurate, but value neutral, way of describing the events that are the 
                                                
18 Cooper, M (2008ii), ‘Addendum Report to the BNTS report’ Office of the Commissioner for Sustainability and the Environment, 
28 March 2008:  www.envcomm.act.gov.au/investigations_and_consultation/investigation/belconnen2#body . 
19 Department of Defence ‘Kangaroo Management at Belconnen Naval Transmitting Station’ MSPA 136/08, 16 May 2008: 
www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=7731. 
20 ‘Defence ACT in talks over problem roos’ ABC news, 11 April 2007: www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/11/2214102.htm. 
21 Department of Defence ‘Defence Proposes Trial Kangaroo Management Program’ MSPA 80/08, 31 March 2008: 
www.defence.gov.au/media/departmentaltpl.cfm?CurrentId=7548; McLennan, D and E Kretowicz ‘Belconnen kangaroo cull 
back on again’ Canberra Times, 17 May 2008: www.canberratimes.com.au/news/local/news/general/belconnen-kangaroo-cull-
back-on-again/772086.aspx. 
22 Department of Defence ‘Public Information Line for Kangaroo Manage-ment at Belconnen Defence Site’ MSPA 140/08, 20 May 
2008: www.defence.gov.au/media/AlertTpl.cfm?CurrentId=7740. 
23 Cardwell, S ‘Canberra roo cull ends with 514 dead’ Herald Sun, 2 June 2008:  
www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23799532-5005961,00.html. 
24 McLennan, D ‘Kangaroos cost nearly $1000 each to kill’ Canberra Times, 4 June 2008. 
25 Kangaroos Report by the Select Committee on Animal Welfare 1988, Commonwealth of Australia, AGPS Canberra, p5. 
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subject of this paper.  The question remains, however, as to why the 
kangaroos had to be killed in order to be removed from the site.   
 
Why was a lethal solution adopted? 
All players involved in this case agreed that the kangaroos had to be 
removed from the BNTS site, yet opinions varied as to why.  While 
seemingly at odds with each other, the main reasons given to justify the 
removal of the kangaroos included the need to protect native grasslands 
and threatened species on the site from overgrazing by the kangaroos, 
and the need to prevent the kangaroos themselves from starving.  26   
Neither of these reasons is, of course, a justification for killing the 
kangaroos.  At most, they are reasons why the kangaroos should have 
been moved.  Even on that basis, however, neither reason is entirely 
compelling.  In its assessment of the kangaroos in August 2007, the 
Department of Defence’s own expert panel reported that there was ‘no 
current evidence of starvation.’27  A local wildlife organisation with 
specialist knowledge of kangaroos confirmed in March 2008 that the 
kangaroos ‘are not and never were starving.’28   
If the kangaroos were not starving, then perhaps there is some credence 
in the claim that they were overgrazing the endangered native grasses 
(the ‘Ginninderra peppercress’29) and thereby jeopardising the chances 
of survival of the two threatened animal species on the site (the Golden 
Sun Moth30 and the Perunga Grasshopper31).  Yet ‘kangaroo grazing’ is 
                                                
26 See for example Cooper, M (2008i); Cardwell, S, op.cit; RSPCA (ACT) ‘Kangaroos – The Facts. Unravelling the Issues’: 
www.rspca-act.org.au/pages/page153.asp; TAMS ‘Kangaroo Culling on Defence Lands – Fact 
Sheet’: 
www.tams.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/56823/Kangaroo_Culling_on_Def
ence_lands.pdf. 
27 Department of Defence, Expert Panel Assessment ‘Management of Kangaroo-related Environmental and Animal Welfare Issues’ 
August 2007, p10 army.gov.au/publications/kangaroo_assessment.pdf; see also Wildcare ‘What’s all the fuss about’ 12 August 
2007: www.wildcare.com.au/mediareleases.html. 
28 Wildcare, ‘An Open Letter to the People of Canberra from Wildcare to Correct Misinformation about the Belconnen Kangaroo 
Translocation Project’ Canberra Times, 8 March 2008: www.wildcare.com.au/media/WildcareMedia_08Mar08.pdf.  Wildcare 
is the only wildlife organisation in the region with kangaroo expertise, as the ACT Government does not allow the 
rehabilitation of Eastern Grey Kangaroos within its jurisdiction: see Recommendation 17 in ACT Kangaroo Advisory 
Committee, ‘Living with Eastern Grey Kangaroos in the ACT – Public Land’ Third Report to the Minister for the 
Environment, Land and Planning, October 1997.  Licences issued to wildlife carers in the ACT, including to the local RSPCA, 
reflect this policy in the conditions imposed on the licence.   
29 Ginninderra peppercress is listed on the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) List of 
Threatened Flora as ‘vulnerable’: www.environment.gov.au/cgi-
bin/sprat/public/publicthreatenedlist.pl?wanted=flora#FLORA_VULNERABLE . 
30 The Golden Sun Moth is listed on the EPBC Act List of Threatened Fauna as ‘critically endangered’: 
www.environment.gov.au/cgi-
bin/sprat/public/publicthreatenedlist.pl?wanted=fauna#OTHER%20ANIMALS_CRITICALLY%20ENDANGERED. 
31 The Perunga Grasshopper has been declared a ‘vulnerable species’ under the Nature Conservation Act 1980 (ACT): 
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not listed as a threat in the relevant information regarding the threatened 
flora or fauna species.32  Moreover, even if the threatened status of the 
grasslands33 had originally been a compelling argument for the removal 
of the kangaroos, this line of argument was devalued by subsequent 
events.  In the first place, the four-wheel drive and other motor vehicles 
used in the herding and killing process turned the site into a ‘dust 
bowl’.34   Then, four months after the kangaroos were removed, reports 
emerged that the site is heavily affected by contamination arising from 
‘underground fuel storage tanks, contaminated soil, landfill and 
chemical stores,’ and that remediation of the site may involve removing 
several hundred square metres of topsoil and replanting the area.35   As a 
final irony, the Department of Defence ultimately plans to transfer the 
site to the ACT Government so it can be used for residential and 
recreational purposes.  In fact, the main point of the Department’s 
recently completed Remediation Action Plan for the site is to ensure it is 
‘safe for housing before it is disposed of.’36  
As a disturbing indictment of our attitude of the expendability of 
‘abundant’ wildlife in Australia, arguments for removing the kangaroos 
were in some cases simply assumed to be arguments for killing the 
kangaroos.  For example, several federal government ministers who 
considered that the kangaroos were responsible for the deteriorating 
state of the grasslands automatically assumed that the kangaroos should 
be killed. 37  Such an attitude towards our native wildlife may help 
explain why Australia has one of the world’s worst records for 
slaughtering wildlife.  38 
Others, however, accepted that while the kangaroos should be removed, 
                                                                                                        
www.tams.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/58662/Perunga_Grasshopper.pdf  
32 For the Ginninderra Peppercress, see its Recovery Plan: 
www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/publications/recovery/l-ginninderrense/conservation.html#threats .  Note 
that the Plan lists ‘kangaroo grazing’ as a ‘key component’ of its management.  
33 The Grasslands are listed as an endangered ecological community under the EPBC Act: www.environment.gov.au/cgi-
bin/sprat/public/publicshowcommunity.pl?id=14&status=Endangered .  
34 A graphic written and pictorial account of the kill is available at: www.kangaroolives.com. This website has been placed in the 
archives of the National Library of Australia. 
35 The Hon. Dr Mike Kelly, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence, ‘Remediation of the Belconnen Naval 
Transmission Station’ PARLSEC43/08, 27 September 2008: www.minister.defence.gov.au/Kellytpl.cfm?CurrentId=8270 and 
Beeby, R, ‘City tip in line for tonnes of toxic soil’ Canberra Times, 30 September 2008: 
www.canberratimes.com.au/news/local/news/general/city-tip-in-line-for-tonnes-of-toxic-soil/1320912.aspx. 
36 The Hon. Dr Mike Kelly, ibid, emphasis added. 
37 See statements by Stephen Smith and Peter Garrett in ‘Cruel or necessary evil’ The Age, 20 May 2008: 
www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/05/30/1211654321584.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap2 . 
38 This aspect of Australia’s wildlife record was already observed in the 1980s: Erlich, P and A The Causes and Consequences of 
the Disappearance of Species, New York, 1981.  See also www.awpc.org.au/newsite/kangaroos/kangaroos.html, 
www.kangaroo-protection-coalition.com/nswaatappeal2008.html, www.animalsaustralia.org/issues/kangaroo_shooting.php, 
and www.voiceless.org.au/About_Us/Voiceless_in_Print_2006/Taking_a_stand_for_all_animals.html.  
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the non-lethal solution of translocating them should at least be 
considered. Translocation had long been the Department of Defence’s 
preferred solution, and for the most part the Department pursued this 
option in various forms up until the last minute when it made its final 
decision to reject it in favour of a ‘cull’.  Its immediate rationale for 
rejecting the translocation research project was that it was too costly.39  
The Department’s ‘rough estimate’ of the cost of the research project 
was $3.5 million, and it claimed the Federal Government withdrew its 
support for a translocation research project as it did not consider it ‘to 
be a cost effective use of taxpayers’ money.’40  The ‘costs’ argument 
cannot have been the sole reason for rejecting translocation in favour of 
killing the kangaroos.  Many animal protection and wildlife 
organisations offered to translocate the kangaroos for far less than the 
$3.5 million quoted for the scientific translocation project. 41  Some 
groups with extensive experience in rehabilitating and translocating 
kangaroos even offered to move them for free.42  Another explanation 
was that there were no suitable sites to release the kangaroos.  Yet 
animal organisations had offered large areas of private land suitable for 
the ‘soft release’ (involving appropriate containment and slow release) 
of the kangaroos.43   
The ACT Government also claimed it was against its policy to 
translocate ‘abundant species like Eastern Grey Kangaroos’ in the 
ACT.44  The ACT Government publicly states, however, that it is aware 
of the need for animal welfare standards to be able to change to reflect 
new knowledge and changing community expectations.45  The ACT 
Government, conflating longevity and appropriateness,46 nevertheless 
clings to this decade-old policy regarding the translocation of Eastern 
Grey Kangaroos at the risk, it could be suggested, of applying it 
                                                
39 Department of Defence ‘Kangaroo management at Belconnen Naval Transmitting Station’ Op.cit.  This media release was issued 
on 16 May 2008, the day on which the cull process began.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Budget Estimates, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 4 June 2008: 
www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S10871.pdf.  When asked about the costs of simply translocating the kangaroos, as 
opposed to the scientific trial, the Defence Secretary replied that he did not think the Department had done ‘anything like an 
accurate estimation of what a translocation would cost’ (p70).  
42 Wildcare, ‘An Open Letter to the People of Canberra from Wildcare to Correct Misinformation about the Belconnen Kangaroo 
Translocation Project’ Op.cit. 
43 Wildcare ‘The kangaroo population at the Belconnen Naval Transmitting Station.  A preliminary proposal to the Department of 
Defence for non-lethal interventions consistent with a whole-of-ecosystem environmental plan’ July 2007: 
www.wildcare.com.au/media/Wildcare_Proposal_Summary.pdf. 
44 Recommendation 5 in ACT Kangaroo Advisory Committee, op.cit; and TAMS ‘Kangaroo culling on Defence lands – Fact sheet’ 
www.tams.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/56823/Kangaroo_Culling_on_Defence_lands.pdf. 
45 TAMS ‘Animal Welfare – Government Responsibilities’ at www.tams.act.gov.au/live/pets/animalwelfare/animalwelfare-
governmentresponsibilities  
46 See Animal Liberation ACT, A Critique of the Final Report of the ‘Expert’ Panel on the BNTS Grasslands, 2008, p5: www.al-
act.org/files/Animal Liberation Grassland Critique.doc . 
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inflexibly without regard to the merits of each particular case. 47   
Another argument against translocation was that it was less humane 
than killing the animals. The principle proponents of this view were the 
RSPCA (ACT) and the Commissioner for Sustainability and the 
Environment ACT’s Expert Panel (which included the CEO of the 
RSPCA). 48  Yet the method ultimately used to kill the kangaroos was 
far from the most humane method of destruction, even according to 
those who advocated a lethal solution.  In its Final Report, the expert 
panel would have preferred a number of more humane ways of killing 
the kangaroos, but it concluded that they would not be appropriate in the 
particular circumstances of the BNTS case.  Shooting, the ‘most 
humane lethal method of removing kangaroos,’ was not considered 
acceptable by the Australian Federal Police because of ‘public safety 
concerns’ (due to the proximity of the BNTS site to residential areas).49  
The panel therefore considered euthanasia by lethal injection as the 
‘next best method of lethal removal’.50  It acknowledged that the 
potential for injuries and associated stress inherent in this method could 
be reduced by using ‘a more passive means’ of approaching and tran-
quillising the kangaroos such as ‘free range darting’ rather than herding 
them into pens (which is how the tranquillisation process was ultimately 
carried out).51  Again, however, the Panel considered it was unlikely that 
this method would be appropriate at the BNTS site.  52  Other ‘experts’ 
agreed that darting followed by lethal injection is not a humane way of 
dealing with animals at high density, because ‘darting them is much 
more likely to go wrong and cause injury and maim animals rather than 
a lethal [gun]shot from a trained marksman.  ’53  Ultimately, even those 
in favour of killing the BNTS kangaroos had to admit that the chosen 
method of killing the animals was at best ‘the most humane method 
suitable for the BNTS site’.54  This is a far lower standard than simply 
‘the most humane method,’ and seriously undermines any claim that 
killing the animals was ‘more humane’ than moving them. 
As none of the arguments used to justify killing rather than moving the 
BNTS kangaroos is particularly compelling, it is tempting to suggest 
                                                
47 The inflexible application of policy when exercising a discretionary power is an ‘improper exercise’ of that power under the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT): s5(2)(f). 
48 Cooper, M (2008i), op.cit.  Note that the Panel’s first argument for not translocating the kangaroos was that it was against current 
ACT Government policy: p8. 
49 Ibid, p9. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 ‘Kangaroo cull in Canberra – experts react’ Australian Science Media Centre website, 25 March 2008: 
www.aussmc.org/KangarooCull.php.  
54 Cooper, M (2008i), op.cit, Attachment G, Panel Recommendation No.3. 
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that the legal framework itself was at least partly responsible for the 
final, and lethal, outcome.  In fact, the killing of the BNTS kangaroos 
highlighted what many in the wildlife protection sector have known for 
a long time: that Australia’s regulatory environment governing wildlife 
is overly complex and ultimately inadequate.   
 
Characteristics of the animal welfare regulatory framework 
governing the BNTS kangaroos  
Those wishing to protect the lives of Australia’s wildlife from 
exploitation and indiscriminate killing are well aware of the 
considerable obstacles in their way.  Significant confusion about where 
the responsibility for making decisions lies, and which laws and policy 
apply, makes it extremely difficult to seek interim relief, or to take 
action against perceived acts of cruelty in the ‘management’ of the 
animals.  If we needed to be reminded of this lamentable situation, the 
BNTS case highlighted many of the flaws inherent in our regulatory 
environment regarding wildlife, especially the complexities of the legal 
framework, the potentially large number of organisations and 
individuals involved, and the confusion over jurisdictions.   
Licence requirements 
The Nature Conservation Act 1992 (ACT) sets out the main licence 
requirements for controlling kangaroos in the ACT.  Killing kangaroos 
(the main form of ‘control’ of Eastern Grey Kangaroos in the ACT)55 
requires permits to capture (if required) and to kill. 56  In the unlikely 
event that a proposal to move kangaroos interstate were to be approved, 
a further licence would be required to ‘export’ them from the ACT. 57  
Decisions regarding wildlife licences are made by the Conservator of 
Flora and Fauna,58 appointed under the Nature Conservation Act 1992.59 
As various proposals were made during the BNTS case to translocate 
many or all of the kangaroos to NSW, licences for ‘importing’ wildlife 
into NSW and for ‘liberating’ (ie releasing) them in NSW, would have 
been required under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW). 60  
While ACT policy regarding the translocation of Eastern Grey 
Kangaroos is that they should not be moved, NSW has guidelines 
                                                
55 Due to the longstanding government policy in the ACT that rescued Eastern Grey Kangaroos cannot be kept for longer than 48 
hours, and that Eastern Grey Kangaroos must not be translocated, they are usually euthanized.  
56 Sections 44-45, Nature Conservation Act 1992 (ACT). 
57 Section 48, Nature Conservation Act 1992 (ACT). 
58 Section 103, Nature Conservation Act 1992 (ACT). 
59 Section 7, Nature Conservation Act 1992 (ACT). 
60 Sections 106 and 109, National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW). 
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regarding the translocation of ‘threatened fauna’.61  The guidelines apply 
equally to all species,62 and set out principles of when they should be 
translocated.  It does not recommend against the translocation of 
Eastern Grey Kangaroos.   
As is evident, a translocation proposal similar to those made in relation 
to the BNTS kangaroos would require significant cooperation between 
the various players.  As the owner of the land in the BNTS case, the 
Commonwealth Government had to negotiate with the ACT and NSW 
governments about suitable relocation sites and the various 
requirements under their respective laws and policies.  While the 
relevant NSW authority had indicated it would be prepared to consider a 
translocation proposal,63 the ACT Government steadfastly refused to 
countenance any form of translocation, even one where the kangaroos 
would be leaving the ACT.  Therefore, despite the practical benefits of 
the scientifically monitored translocation proposed by the Department 
of Defence,64 and despite translocations being possible under both NSW 
and ACT law and under NSW policy, the Department of Defence was 
left with ‘no option but to euthanize the kangaroos.’65  It seems that the 
sheer complexity and unworkability of the governing framework sealed 
the fate of the BNTS kangaroos much more than issues such as costs, 
the lack of suitable release sites, or matters of animal welfare.   
 
Possible interim relief and administrative review of decisions 
in the BNTS case 
The complexity of the regulatory framework governing wildlife, and 
general confusion over who is responsible for what and under which 
law, can inhibit attempts by individuals or animal protection organisat-
ions to seek injunctive relief or review of relevant decisions.  The 
Nature Conservation Act 1980 (ACT) allows for parties other than ‘the 
                                                
61 NSW National parks and Wildlife Service, ‘Policy for the translocation of threatened fauna in NSW’ Policy and Procedure 
Statement No 9, Department of Environment and Climate Change (NSW), October 2001: 
www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/nature/policyFaunaTranslocation.pdf.   
62 ‘Policy on the translocation of threatened fauna in NSW – February 2005’, Department of Environment and Climate Change 
(NSW) website: 
www.environment.nsw.gov.au/policiesandguidelines/FaunaTranslocationPolicy.htm 
63 Cooper, M (2008ii), op.cit, Attachment C. 
64 Not only would the translocation have avoided killing the animals, but the Secretary of Defence stated in Senate Estimates on 4 
June 2008 that: ‘Under translocation, we would have picked up the kangaroos and moved them to another site.  The trial 
would have been scientifically monitored, it would have thrown up information available to Defence but also to scientists 
about the utility of moving kangaroos in those numbers under those circumstances.’  Hansard, op.cit. 
65 Ibid.  See also Beeby, R, ‘Roo cull back on: Defence blocked’ Canberra Times, 4 March 2008: ‘The president of the late Steve 
Irwin's Queensland-based Wildlife Protection Association, Pat O'Brien, ... flew from Queensland to Canberra last Friday to 
meet senior Defence officials, who had previously told him they wanted to discuss details of the proposed relocation 
operation.  “I got the impression they had run into a brick wall, because instead of discussing the translocation, the bureaucrat 
I met with kept saying there wasn't much Defence could do if the ACT wouldn't issue the permits.”’ 
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conservator’ to apply to the ACT Supreme Court for ‘injunctive’ or 
‘interim’ orders in certain limited circumstances, and provided it is 
necessary ‘for the protection or conservation of native animals’.66   
Applications can be made to the ACT Administrative Appeals Tribunal67 
for review of a decision by the Conservator to grant or refuse to grant a 
licence under the Nature Conservation Act 1980 (ACT).68  Under the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1989 (ACT), the application can be 
made by or on behalf of any person, including the Commonwealth, 
‘whose interests are affected by the decision.’69  An organisation’s 
interests will be taken to be affected by a decision ‘if the decision 
relates to a matter included in the objects or purposes of the 
organisation.’70 
In practice, however, while there may be scope for seeking interim 
relief or review of critical decisions made in cases such as the BNTS 
‘cull’, the actual circumstances of the BNTS case made any such action 
virtually impossible.  After months, if not years, of prevaricating on the 
issue, and after publicly rejecting the idea of killing the kangaroos in 
favour of translocating them, the Department of Defence announced its 
definitive decision late on a Friday afternoon just hours before 
preparations for the kill began in earnest.71  Individuals and animal 
protection organisations were left with little option but to observe the 
kill from the ‘safe’ side of the fences, and to document any perceived 
incidents of cruelty in the hope that action would be brought against the 
perpetrators by the appropriate authorities under the relevant anti-
cruelty legislation.   
Nevertheless, despite numerous accounts and video footage posted on 
websites suggesting that there were such incidents,72 no such action was 
taken.  In considering why nothing was done, especially given the 
notoriety of the BNTS case and the perceived severity of the incidents, 
it again seems that confusion about the legal framework may have been 
                                                
66 Sections 92-94 in Part 9 ‘Injunctive orders’.  The Supreme Court can order applicants to give security for costs: s96. 
67 Since the time of writing, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ACT has been replaced by the ACT Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (ACAT).  The establishment of the new Tribunal resulted in consequential changes to the 
Nature Conservation Act 1980 (ACT).  Applications for review of a decision to grant a licence to kill a native animal 
can now be made to the ACAT by an entity that has interests affected by the licence, or by any other person whose 
interests are affected by the decision (Nature Conservation Act 1980: s116 and item 7 in Schedule 1).  The ACT Civil 
and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) states that a body has interests that are affected by a decision if the 
decision relates to a matter included in the objects or purposes of the body (s22Q). 
68 Section 114. 
69 Section 25(1), Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1989 (ACT). 
70 Section 25(2), Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1989 (ACT). 
71 Department of Defence ‘Kangaroo Management at Belconnen Naval Transmitting Station’ op.cit, and McLennan, D and E 
Kretowicz, op.cit. 
72 See for example the photojournalistic record of the killing at www.kangaroolives.com.   
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at least partly to blame.  Uncertainty over which guidelines on killing 
kangaroos should apply, and which animal welfare laws, if any, should 
govern the actions of the kill was inevitable in the circumstances of the 
BNTS case.  Perhaps the biggest source of confusion in episodes 
involving the ‘control’ of kangaroos behind Commonwealth fences is 
the question of overlap between jurisdictions.  The BNTS case was no 
exception as the land on which the events unfolded is situated in the 
middle of suburban Canberra, but is owned by the Commonwealth (the 
Department of Defence).  The legal intricacies of situations such as the 
BNTS case need to be clarified.  Such cases are certain to occur again.73 
 
The animal welfare framework  
A common assumption in situations such as the BNTS case is that the 
local animal welfare legislation does not apply when wildlife is killed 
on Commonwealth land,74 which would mean that no legislation would 
apply as there is no Commonwealth animal welfare legislation.  This 
‘anomaly’ is of course part of a much larger ‘constitutional quagmire’ 
regarding the application of State and Territory law to Commonwealth 
places,75 and as such cannot be discussed here in detail.  In general, 
however, cases such as the BNTS ‘cull’ do not involve issues of 
‘inconsistency’ between local and Commonwealth law because there is 
no Commonwealth law that directly regulates animal welfare.76   And 
while the Commonwealth may not be able to be prosecuted for animal 
cruelty,77 it is unlikely that anti-cruelty legislation would not apply to 
the Commonwealth by virtue of an implied Commonwealth immunity.78   
The general approach to determining whether a State or Territory law 
                                                
73 For example, further lethal action has been proposed in relation to the population of wallabies at the Tindal Air Base in the 
Northern Territory: The Hon. Dr Mike Kelly, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence, ‘Increased Wallaby 
Management Activities at RAAF Tindal’ PARLSEC63/08, 2 December 2008 
www.minister.defence.gov.au/kellytpl.cfm?CurrentId=8546 .  Even in Canberra, a second population of Eastern Grey 
Kangaroos on defence land at the Majura Training Base is under threat of ‘control’ by euthanasia: ABC News ‘Future of 
second roo population uncertain’ 3 June 2008 www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/06/03/2263149.htm. 
74 On the day the killings actually started the CEO of RSPCA (ACT) stated that ‘[l]egally we have no jurisdiction, so the 
Department of Defence are doing the right thing by even allowing our inspectors on site.’ (‘Darting roos still best option: 
RSPCA’ Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May: news.smh.com.au/national/darting-roos-still-best-option-rspca-20080520-
2g7d.html ). 
75 Lee, RJ, ‘Applicability of State Laws to Commonwealth Land and Activities,’ [2002] UWSLRev 3.  Note that the 
Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 (Cth) deals with State laws: s4(1). 
76 There is no direct ‘head of power’ in s51 of the Constitution that allows the Commonwealth to legislate in relation to animal 
welfare.  Note also that the ‘inconsistency of laws’ provision in the Constitution (s109) deals with State laws.  
77 Note that the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) expressly includes this exemption (s5(2)). 
78 National bodies such as the National Consultative Committee on Animal Welfare (NCCAW) have long stated their view that 
animal welfare legislation should bind the Crown.  See for example its ‘Revised Position Statement - April 1997’: Each 
Australian state and territory government should enact legislation, under the Animal Welfare Act or equivalent, to 
prevent cruelty to animals ... The Act should define grades of cruelty to an animal and be binding on the Crown.  
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applies to the Commonwealth is to consider whether any such law is 
intended ‘to bind the Crown’ in right of the Commonwealth.79  
Interestingly, all anti-cruelty statutes in Australia except the ACT statute 
are expressed to apply to the Crown. 80   The Queensland statute is the 
most explicit.  It states that ‘this Act binds all persons, including the 
State and, to the extent the legislative power of the Parliament permits, 
the Commonwealth and the other States’ (s5(1)).81 
The situation is just as confusing when considering which policy 
guidelines or Code of Practice dealing with ‘destroying’ kangaroos 
should apply where the animals are killed on Commonwealth land.  
While there is a Commonwealth Code, it only covers shooting 
kangaroos for non-commercial purposes.82  In the BNTS case, however, 
the kangaroos were not shot – they were darted with tranquillisers then 
euthanized by lethal injection.  The ACT Code of Practice for the 
Humane Destruction of Kangaroos is in many ways broader in scope 
than the Commonwealth Code.83  The ACT Code sets out minimum 
requirements for capturing kangaroos in order to kill them, and for 
killing kangaroos for culling and scientific purposes, and where they 
may be injured due to road or shooting accidents.84  It also covers a 
wider range of ‘destruction’ methods than the national Code in so far as 
it deals with lethal injection and poisoning.85   
 
Compliance and enforcement of animal welfare laws and 
policies  
 
According to statements made by the relevant authorities in relation to 
the BNTS case, the Department of Defence, through its contractor, was 
responsible for the welfare of the kangaroos during their removal,86 and 
the killing of the kangaroos was to comply with the ACT Code of 
Practice.87  To ensure compliance, the Department of Defence arranged 
for RSPCA (ACT) to ‘spot check’ proceedings.
88
  The RSPCA (ACT) 
has only two full-time inspectors, and they were not present throughout 
the entire process.  Yet the CEO of the local animal welfare organisation 
                                                
79 See for example Commonwealth v Western Australia [1999] HCA 5. 
80 See s35A(1) (NSW), s5 (SA, TAS, QLD & NT), and s4 (VIC, WA). 
81 Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (QLD). 
82 National Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos and Wallabies for Non-commercial Purposes, endorsed by the 
Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, November 2008. 
83 See Code of Practice for the Humane Destruction of Kangaroos (ACT): 
www.tams.act.gov.au/live/pets/animalwelfare/animalwelfarestandards-codesofpractice.  
84 Ibid, chapters 2-4. 
85 Ibid, section 3.1. 
86 ACT Legislative Assembly, Debates. Weekly Hansard 7 August 2008,  p3141 (25 June 2008). 
87 TAMS ‘Kangaroo Culling on Defence Lands – Fact Sheet,’ op.cit, p3; McLennan, D and E Kretowicz, op.cit. 
88 ACT Legislative Assembly, op.cit. 
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announced after the killing was completed that he was ‘happy’ with 
how the cull had been carried out, and that it had been ‘undertaken in 
the most humane manner possible.’
89  Several members of the general 
public who monitored the killing from behind the fences had very 
different views.  As mentioned earlier, numerous photos and video 
images of alleged breaches of the ACT Code and other acts of cruelty 
committed during the killings have been posted on the Internet. 
90  These 
accounts reveal alleged attempts to herd the kangaroos from the holding 
pens into the killing pens with security guards as well as four-wheel 
drives and other motor vehicles.  As kangaroos are extremely sensitive 
to stress, any form of herding for destruction purposes is not 
recommended by the ACT Code.  According to the Code: 
 
.  .  .  there is a high risk of injury to the animal … Trapping of 
the larger kangaroos, such as the Eastern Grey, is impractical 
even for small confined populations.  Trapping is stressful for 
these kangaroos and includes the risk of leg breakages and 
capture myopathy causing death.  Trapping to enable 
destruction is not recommended. 
91  
 
The pictures taken during the BNTS killing process suggest that several 
kangaroos did crash into fences and each other causing serious 
injuries.92   Thus, while scientific data on translocating large numbers of 
kangaroos was not able to be collected because the Department of 
Defence was prevented from carrying out its trial, the BNTS case 
certainly confirmed what was already well known about trapping and 
herding large populations of kangaroos in order to euthanize them – that 
it can be an extremely inhumane form of destruction.   
 
While neither the form nor the conduct of the BNTS destruction process 
seems to have been in accordance with the ACT Code, no action has 
been brought in relation to the case. 
93  This is despite the ACT Code 
                                                
89 Cardwell, S. ‘Canberra roo cull ends with 514 dead’ Herald Sun, 2 June 2008: 
www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,23799532-5005961,00.html.   See also RSPCA (ACT), ‘Kangaroos – The Facts’ 
op.cit: ‘[t]he cull is being carried out as humanely as possible.’ 
90 For example www.kangaroolives.com, www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKCA6ecy0Zg , 
http://edgarcrook.blogspot.com/2008/07/kangaroo-cull-video.html , and a wildlife carer’s witness statement in author’s 
possession, 21 May 2008. 
91 Emphasis added.  ACT Code, op.cit, paragraph 2.1.  This recommendation in the ACT Code further undermines the claim that 
killing the animals by this method was more humane than translocating them. 
92 See www.kangaroolives.com.  See also ACT Legislative Assembly, op.cit, p3142: ‘the number of animals euthanized due to 
injury is 21.’ 
93 While the conduct of the actual killing was ignored by the relevant authorities, the activities of the researchers dealing with the 
BNTS kangaroos involved in the fertility control research did not escape notice.  According to correspondence in the author’s 
possession, informal complaints were made by members of the public to the relevant ethics committee that approved the 
research and the matter was investigated.  Yet when a number of onlookers contacted the Australian Federal Police to report 
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being enforceable under local anti-cruelty legislation.
94   The BNTS 
case thus serves as another reminder of the flaws in our animal welfare 
legal framework, especially where that framework relies on Codes of 
Practice that are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.
95  
 
Conclusions 
The BNTS case made clear that as long as the Department of Defence 
intends to ‘manage’ kangaroos (or other animals) behind its fences or on 
its land, it must clarify its animal welfare responsibilities and policies.  
The Department has adopted a clear position in relation to its 
obligations under environmental legislation, and has developed a range 
of policy documents and strategies to improve its environmental 
performance.96  Adopting a similar approach in relation to its ‘animal 
welfare performance’ would not only benefit the animals it ‘manages’, 
but would enhance the general animal welfare regulatory framework 
through improved transparency and accountability.   
As it was, the Department of Defence played an unusual role in the 
BNTS case, which in part may explain why the case was so 
controversial.  The Department persisted with its non-lethal proposal to 
translocate the animals in the face of strong resistance from the local 
government and, ironically, the local animal welfare organisation.  It 
was also willing to undertake a scientific trial of translocations, which 
would have vastly increased our understanding of the viability of 
moving large numbers of wildlife as an alternative to killing them.   
Ultimately, however, the attempts to implement a compassionate 
solution proved impossible in the current regulatory framework 
governing our wildlife.  All too often this framework lets down the 
wildlife it is supposed to protect – none more so than the BNTS 
kangaroos who lived behind fences, but who died outside the law.   
_____________________
                                                                                                        
alleged breaches of the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) (all serving AFP officers are authorised as inspectors under that Act), 
they were advised it was a matter for the RSPCA.  
94 Section 20, which sets out the usual exception concerning the inapplicability of an animal welfare offence if the conduct making 
up the offence is in accordance with an approved Code of Practice (the Code of Practice for the Humane Destruction of 
Kangaroos was approved under s22 of the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) in 1994).  In this case, aspects of the killing were 
arguably not in accordance with the Code, and therefore the exception would not apply. 
95 The weaknesses of the Code of Practice system have been well documented elsewhere.  See for example Senate Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport Committee ‘Adequacy of Wildlife Regulations’ in Commercial Utilisation of Australian Native 
Wildlife, June 1998, Chapter 6: www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/completed_inquiries/1996-
99/wild/report/c06.htm. 
96 See Defence Environmental Management, Department of Defence website [8 December 2008]: 
www.defence.gov.au/environment. 
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Introduction 
 
Between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the animal 
protection movement in England was going through a remarkable 
period of development.  Notable scholars, parliamentarians and jurists 
including Lord Erskine, Richard Marks, Blackstone, Bentham and 
Bacon had articulated positions on the legal status of animals.  By the 
third decade of the nineteenth century, the British parliament had passed 
its first modern era anti animal cruelty legislation.   
As these significant developments were taking place in Britain, 
on the other side of the world, in the infant colony of New South Wales, 
animals were also appearing as prominent characters throughout 
Australia’s first superior court records.  Animals were a feature of daily 
life in the criminal jurisdiction, in matters involving trade, commerce 
and throughout the civil jurisdiction.  Animals also featured prominently 
in crucial early cases that considered the limits of British sovereignty 
and the reception of British law.   
The purpose of this paper, written in two parts over two issues, 
is twofold.  The first purpose is to uncloak the unique body of court 
records, from this earliest period after European colonisation, which 
define the relationship between animals and the colonial legal system.  
Despite the prominence of animals in some of the most significant cases 
in the first 40 years of settlement, the historical relationship between 
animals and the law in Australia has received very limited attention. 1 
                                                
* Research Fellow,  Division of Law, Macquarie University. 
1 T.  Castle and B.  Kercher provide a comprehensive chapter of cases involving animals from the later period 1828-1844, but 
nothing has been written on the first period after settlement.  See: T.  Castle and B.  Kercher (eds), Dowling’s Select Cases 
1828 to 1844 (2005) 8-56.  In 2009 a new report is being published covering the first forty years after settlement and 
comprising of many cases examined in this paper: See B.  Kercher and B.  Salter (eds), The Kercher Reports: Cases from the 
Superior Courts of NSW (1788-1827) (2009) (hereafter “N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher)”).  Most of these cases are also 
[2009] 2 AAPLJ 36  
The second purpose of the paper is to situate the jurisprudence 
of the early colonial courts in the context of the development of new 
English ideas.  The paper will examine the extent to which the legal 
status of animals in the colony was understood in terms of possession 
rather than protection, and whether a “property-based” understanding of 
the legal status of animals had ramifications for the development of the 
animal protection movement between 1788 and 1830.   
Part 1 below will briefly trace the development of the animal 
protection movement in Britain during the critical period between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  During this same period, the infant 
legal system of the colony of New South Wales was also beginning to 
evolve.  Part 1 will provide an overview of the earliest years of the 
colonial courts with specific reference to animal related cases appearing 
in the Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Australia’s first criminal court.    
 
I  British Origins and Colonial Beginnings 
 
a) The evolution of animal protection in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries 
 
Laws pertaining to animals and animal protection were beginning to 
emerge in British law at the time of the arrival of the First Fleet at 
Sydney Cove in January 1788.  Indeed, in the century between 1750 and 
1850 the animal protection movement in Britain went through a 
dramatic period of development and featured some of the most 
significant figures in English jurisprudence.  William Nelson’s Laws 
Concerning Game 2, first published in 1753, gave one of the earliest 
accounts of the relationship between animals and the law.  As the title 
suggests however, Nelson’s treatise had very little to say on the 
protection of animals and more on a legal framework for hunting.  
Reverend Humphrey Primatt’s A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and 
Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals,
3 published in 1776, explicitly 
considered the legal status of animals.  Primatt makes the plea in what 
must be one of the first treatise of its kind: 
                                                                                                        
available online at: Decisions of the Superior Courts of NSW available at: www.law.mq.edu.au/scnsw/ (hereafter “Decisions 
of the Superior Courts of NSW”). 
2 W.  Nelson, The laws concerning game : of hunting, hawking, fishing and fowling, &c.  and of forests, chases, parks, warrens, 
deer, doves, dove-cotes, conies ...  together with the forest laws ...  (first pub 1753, available Rare Books, University of 
Sydney). 
3 H.  Primatt , A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals (first pub 1776; 2007 ed Kessinger Pub 
Co.).  There were other early 18th calls for reform: see for eg John Lawrence, A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on 
Horses, "On the Rights of Beasts," (1796); Thomas Young, Essay on Humanity to Animals, "On Cruelty to Horses," (1798); 
Charles Daubeny, A Sermon on Cruelty to Dumb Animals (1799).   
[2009] 2 AAPLJ 37  
See that no brute of any kind .  .  .  whether intrusted to thy care, 
or coming in thy way, suffer thy neglect or abuse.  Let no views 
of profit, no compliance with custom, and no fear of ridicule of 
the world, ever tempt thee to the least act of cruelty or injustice to 
any creature whatsoever.  But let this be your invariable rule, 
everywhere, and at all times, to do unto others as, in their 
condition, you would be done unto.  4 
David Favre, in his brief but comprehensive account of the development 
of the animal protection movement, identifies utilitarian Jeremy 
Bentham as a key figure of the eighteenth century to address the legal 
status of animals.  Favre writes of Bentham’s Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780)5 : 
it was closely studied at the time by a large number of 
individuals, some of whom went on to propose legislation for the 
protection of animals.6 Bentham argued that there was no reason 
why animals should not be accorded protection under the law.  
Bentham pointed out that animals, "on account of their interests 
having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, 
stand degraded into the class of things".  Within a footnote 
entitled "Interests of the inferior animals improperly neglected in 
legislation," Bentham argued that the capacity for suffering is the 
vital characteristic that gives a being the right to legal 
consideration. 7 
In the early nineteenth century animal protection reform went through a 
period of significant development and Thomas Erskine was at the 
forefront of this movement.  In 1809 Erskine introduced a Bill into 
parliament for the prevention of malicious and wanton cruelty to 
animals.  In his address to the House of Lords Erskine commented: 
They (animals) are created, indeed, for our use, but not for our 
abuse.  Their freedom and enjoyment, when they cease to be 
consistent with our just dominions and enjoyment, can be no part 
of their natures; but whilst they are consistent I say their rights, 
subservient as they are, ought to be as sacred as our own .  .  .  the 
                                                
4 Primatt cited in D.  Favre, “Overview of Historical Materials”, Animal Legal and Historical Centre (2002) available at: 
www.animallaw.info/historical/articles/ovushistory.htm . 
5 D.  Favre, above n 4.   
6 J.  Bentham, An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation (printed for pub 1780 first pub 1789; 1982 ed by J.  H.  
Burns, H.  L.  A.  Hart).  Chap.  17, § 1, ¶4. 
7  Favre claims that the final sentence of the footnote is often used today as a rallying cry for those seeking to promote the cause of 
animal rights.  "The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer."  
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bill I propose to you, if it shall receive the sanction of Parliament, 
will not only be an honor to the country, but an era in the history 
of the world.  
8
  
The Bill was passed in the House of Lords, but eventually defeated in 
the Commons.  Despite this initial setback, the 1809 Bill was an 
important gateway to the eventual re-introduction of animal protection 
legislation into the British Parliament some 13 years later.  In June 
1822, Irish politician and animal welfare advocate Richard Martin 
successfully guided the first animal protection bill through parliament: 
An Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Animals.9  The 
landmark legislation provided that it was an offence to: 
 
Wantonly and cruelly beat, abuse, or ill-treat any Horse, Mare, 
Gelding, Mule, Ass, Ox, Cow, Heifer, Steer, Sheep, or other 
Cattle  
 
If convicted, the prisoner would “forfeit and pay any Sum not exceeding 
Five Pounds, not less than Ten Shillings”,10 and if the convicted refused 
to pay this fine they could be  
 
committed to the House of Correction or some other Prison within 
the Jurisdiction within which the Offence shall have been 
committed, there to be kept without Bail or Mainprize for any 
Time not exceeding Three Months.  11 
Within 70 years, writing on animals and the law had developed from the 
rules of game hunting articulated by Nelson, to legislative recognition 
of animal protection in British law.  It is against this extraordinary 
period of development in the animal rights movement that the 
relationship between animals and the law in the infant colony of New 
South Wales can be considered.   
b) Australia’s colonial legal origins: 
                                                
8 See D.  Favre, above n 4; The speech of Lord Erskine, in The House of Peers, on 15th of May, 1809, On the Second Reading of 
The Bill for Preventing Malicious and Wanton Cruelty To Animals, 274-276.   
9 Act to Prevent the Cruelty and Improper Treatment of Cattle, 1822, July 22.  Note that Thomas Wentworth's Act of 1635 in 
Ireland, as well as Nathaniel Ward's contribution to the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 establishes American and 
English law against cruelty to animals almost 200 years prior to the passage of Richard Martin's 1822 Bill to Prevent the Cruel 
and Improper Treatment of Cattle, but both legislative attempts are relatively unknown.  Indeed, there is evidence of ancient 
Greek law for the protection of animals.  Xenocrates for example examines animal protection and Triptolemus, ‘the most 
ancient of the Athenian legislators...established laws for the Athenians…Honour your parents; Sacrifice to the Gods from the 
fruits of the earth; Injure not animals.’ Porphyry, On Abstinence From Animal Food, "Book the Fourth". 
10 Act to Prevent the Cruelty and Improper Treatment of Cattle, 1822 [1].  
11 Act to Prevent the Cruelty and Improper Treatment of Cattle, 1822 [1]. 
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Between 1788-1823 the civil and criminal superior courts of New South 
Wales operated within the confines of English law, whilst facing 
continual challenges to adapt to the unique circumstances of a penal 
settlement.  12  Until 1824, there were separate criminal and civil 
superior courts in N.S.W.  The Court of Civil Jurisdiction operated from 
1788 until 1814, when it was replaced by the first Supreme Court which 
was also limited to matters in the civil jurisdiction.  That Supreme Court 
was replaced by another of the same name in 1824.  The Court of 
Criminal Jurisdiction operated from 1788 until it was replaced by the 
second Supreme Court in 1824.   
 
Until 1824, these courts had jurisdiction over Van Diemen’s Land, 
which did not become a separate colony until 1825.  The first Supreme 
Court hearing in Hobart was not until 1819.13  The Court of Criminal 
Jurisdiction did not sit there until 1821.14  Before then, the parties from 
Van Diemen’s Land had to travel to Sydney for trial, or matters were 
settled locally.  Norfolk Island had its own Court of Criminal 
Jurisdiction,15 but the much more populous Van Diemen’s Land did not.   
 
The colony’s first judges, David Collins (1788-1796) and Richard 
Atkins (1796-1798; 1800-1809), had no training in law, but by the end 
of 1823 the chief judicial officers were highly trained barristers.16 There 
appears to be little in common between the first superior court decision 
in Australia, R v Barsby on 11 February 1788,17 and the sophisticated 
legal arguments in the Supreme Court of New South Wales that 
commenced proceedings under Chief Justice Francis Forbes in 1824.  
Barsby was heard only a fortnight after the colony commenced, without 
the aid of any legally trained assistance.  Its court records do not show 
what legal reasoning might have been in operation, if any.  Like so 
many of the early cases, any legal principle underlying the decision 
must be inferred from its facts and outcome, which are all that we have.   
 
Apart from the early judges having limited legal training in the first 
years after settlement, operation of the courts was also compromised by 
                                                
12 Discussion beyond the scope of this paper but see Kercher and Salter ‘Introduction’ in N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher); see D.  
Neal, The rule of law in a penal colony : law and power in early New South Wales (1991).   
13 See Barker v.  Jemott (1819) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 619.   
14 See R v Franklin (1820) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 664. 
15 (1794) 34 Geo.  3, c.  45. 
16 Including Ellis Bent (1810-1815), Fredrick Garling (1815-1816) and John Wylde (1816-1824).  Richard Dore was Australia’s 
first legally trained Judge Advocate (1798-1800).   
17  R v Barsby (1788) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 1.  This was an assault case where the prisoner was found guilty and sentenced 
to 150 lashes. 
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the lack of authoritative legal texts and law reports.  Alex Castles writes 
in his seminal work Australian Legal History :18 
 
In the first decade of the nineteenth century some early issues of 
the Sydney Gazette suggest that law books were probably a prized 
commodity in the colony.  One advertiser twice sought copies of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries. 19 
 
Indeed, the law as enshrined in Blackstone carried significant weight in 
the early years of the Superior Court.20  Writing in the mid eighteenth 
century, Blackstone’s focus in regard to the legal status of animals was 
not on animal protection, but the limits of animal possession.21 One of 
Blackstone’s primary concerns was to draw a distinction in the law 
between wild and domestic animals.  Wild animals were treated as 
possessions of the sovereign not so much because domestic animals 
were tractable, but because the King owned the land of the nation and 
wild animals (like wild plants and flowers, which the King also 
"owned") were viewed as a feature or accompaniment of the land itself.  
In addition, selling licenses to hunt and fish provided the King a 
welcome source of revenue.   
 
Despite the advancements in the legal protection of animals, it was the 
issue of animal possession, framed by the earlier eighteenth century 
writings of the likes of Blackstone, which would pre-occupy the courts 
of N.S.W. in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.  Although 
situations of animal cruelty would continually arise in the facts of civil 
and criminal superior court trials, the protection of the animal was 
always legally invisible next to the primary issue of animal possession.  
As will be illustrated below, possession emerged in the cases in three 
different contexts: possession in regard to criminal behaviour, 
possession in regard to activities of commerce and some of the most 
extraordinary cases of the first 40 years of settlement that consider 
possession of animals in relation to sovereignty.  Although animals play 
a central role in the developing jurisprudence of the colony in terms of 
criminal law, commerce and sovereignty, their protection against 
suffering still firmly exists at the periphery of colonial law and in the 
evolving debates that were occurring in England.   
                                                
18 A.C.  Castles, An Australian Legal History (1982).   
19 Ibid 382.   
20 Ibid 383.  There are a number of significant cases in the early years citing Blackstone see in particular Lord, Attorney for Mechan 
v.  Palmer (1803-1809) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 288; R v Macarthur, (1808) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 379.   
21 See Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England  (1978 Garland Pub ed) Bk.  II, Chpt.  25, 388-390; 698-699. 
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II  CRIMINAL CASES 
 
a) The Criminal Court: 1788 - 1823 
 
The Court of Criminal Jurisdiction was authorised by imperial 
statute, (1787) 27 Geo. 3, c.2.  The Act permitted the King to 
establish a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, to consist of a Judge 
Advocate and “six officers of his Majesty’s forces by sea or 
land”.  Most of the Judge Advocates were not serving officers, but 
until the first barrister was appointed to hold the position in 1809, 
their commissions required them to obey the Governors according 
to the “rules and disciplines of war”.22  The Act provided that the 
court would have jurisdiction over matters which, if occurring 
within the realm, would have been treason, felony or 
misdemeanour.  Charges were to be in writing and exhibited by 
the Judge Advocate, witnesses for both sides were to be examined 
on oath, and decisions were to be by majority rather than 
necessarily unanimous. 23 Sentences were to be either death (if the 
offence were capital) or corporal punishment.  Capital sentences 
required concurrence of five members of the court.  The court was 
to be a court of record, and was to “proceed in a more summary 
way than is used within this realm, according to the known and 
established laws thereof”. 24 
 
Criminal trials involving animals appear throughout the Court of 
Criminal Jurisdiction records between 1788 and 1823.  In 
particular, animal cases emerge a disturbing number of times in 
the context of “unnatural offences” such as bestiality, but even 
more prominently in the context of crimes involving stealing or 
killing cattle.   
 
b) Unnatural offences against animals  
 
The court records of the new settlement indicate that bestiality was 
more common before the turn of the 19th C.  But, the records also showe 
that although the act of bestiality was considered serious, the focus of 
the charge was on the act itself, and the potential loss to the owner of 
                                                
22 A.C.  Castles, Australian Legal History, above n  18, 48. 
23 As to which, see R v Powell and others (1799) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 209.   
24 (1787) 27 Geo. 3, c. 2, Preamble.  The First Charter provided that punishment by the court was to be in accordance with the laws 
of England “as nearly as may be”. 
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the sodomised animal, rather than any notion of wanton cruelty to the 
animal.  In R v Hyson, 1796, the first bestiality case record in the 
archives, the prisoner was charged with committing an unnatural act 
against a dog.  Judge Advocate Collins writes in the minutes: 
 
George Hyson, Labourer, was brought before the Court charged 
for that he not having the fear of God before his Eyes, but being 
moved and seduced by the Instigation of the Devil … in and upon 
one she Dog, then and there being, feloniously did make an 
Assault and then and there feloniously, wickedly, diabolically and 
against the Order of Nature, had a Venereal Affair with the said 
she Dog, and then and there carnally knew the said she Dog and 
then and there, feloniously, wickedly and diabolically and against 
the Order of Nature, did commit and perpetrate that detestable 
and abominable Crime of Buggery. 25 
 
Collins was clearly appalled by the crimes with which Hyson was 
charged, commenting “how unpleasing were the reflections that arose 
from this catalogue of criminals and their offences! No punishment 
however exemplary, no reward however great, could operate on the 
minds of these unthinking people.”  A witness gave evidence that he 
saw the act between the dog and the prisoner, while Hyson claimed that 
he was just playing with the dog.   
 
Curiously, Hyson was not convicted of the more serious crime of 
buggery, but the lesser charge of assault – an offence that usually did 
not attract the death sentence. 26  The conviction was curious because 
assault was the lesser charge when a person was found not guilty of rape 
or buggery of another human.  With no indictment papers or depositions 
available, a question that remains unanswered from the trial record is 
whether Hyson has not been found guilty of assaulting the dog, but 
guilty of “assaulting” the property of a human owner.  If this is the case, 
it is a startling example of the negligible legal status of animals in the 
eyes of the colonial courts beyond being the property of humans.   
 
The circumstances of the Hyson decision were relatively common: a 
witness testifying that they saw the act being committed, the prisoner 
denying the charge, and many immaterial allegations of fact remaining 
unproven. 27  Another ramification for the bestiality cases was that the 
sodomised animal would inevitability be killed after an accused was 
                                                
25 R v Hyson (1796) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 139.   
26 Ibid.  The sentence was “To stand three Times in the Pillory on three [separate] days, and to stand an Hour each Time.  To stand 
the first Time on Saturday the 30th Instant opposite the Provision Store at Sydney, from nine to ten o’Clock”.   
27 See J.F.  Nagle, Collins the Courts and the Colony (1995) 286.   
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convicted of the act.  In R v Reece, 1799, the prisoner was charged for 
having carnal knowledge with a sow in his home.  Two witnesses 
testified to having seen the act; Reece was convicted of the more serious 
offence of buggery and sentenced to death.28  One of many 
extraordinary, and detailed, issues that arose in the trial was whether the 
sodomised pig, that was believed to be pregnant at the time of the act, 
should be killed.  Between the act and the trial a litter of eleven pigs 
were born.  Under English law, the litter was also to be condemned.  
The priority for the Court was not the welfare of the pig and the litter, 
but the loss that would be sustained by the pig’s owner:  
 
But the court taking into consideration the extreme poverty and 
distress of Patrick Brannagham [the owner of the sow] the 
prosecutor in this unhappy business who appears unable to sustain 
a loss so material as the value of said sow which he estimates at 
£15 sterling and moreover as it appears that the said sow has 
ferried since the commitment of this unnatural felony and 
produced a litter of the 11 pigs, also which must be necessarily 
lost by the condemnation of the said sow. 29 
 
The court respectfully submitted the owner’s case to “his Excellency’s 
humane consideration”, recommending remuneration to the owner “as 
to his Excellency’s wisdom and humanity may seem met”.   
 
c) Stealing cases 
 
The central issue for the court in Hyson and Reece above was the loss of 
property sustained by the human property owner.  The colony had a dire 
shortage of food and therefore animals, such as pigs, were a valuable 
commodity; so valuable that theft of sheep, horses and cattle were 
common crimes in the first 40 years of settlement.  Branding identified 
the owner of the animal and many of the superior criminal court trials 
involving the stealing of cattle turned on evidence of animal branding in 
order to establish original ownership.   
 
In R v Tremby and Ors, 1818, Robert Campbell reported that 73 sheep 
were absent from his flock.  Because of these heavy losses, Campbell 
made concerted efforts and eventually discovered that Tremby’s flock 
had been recently increased by a number of newly-marked sheep.  
Another witness Gibson gave evidence stating: 
                                                
28 Reece was executed on 8 February 1799: K.  Macnab, Database of Prisoners Sentenced to Death in New South Wales, 1788-
1968, unpublished.  (Copy supplied to author  by Dr Macnab) 
cited in N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 153. 
29 R v Reece (1799) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 153. 
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His own sheep were marked with three parallel lines, but on 
recovering them they had again been branded with the letter T 
reversed, (the initial of the prisoners’ names), which made four 
lines; those belonging to Mr Lord were branded with the letter L, 
but which had awkwardly been converted into a T, and also of 
course became reversed.  30 
  
Joseph Tremby, senior, Joseph Tremby, junior, and Connor Shean, 
denied all knowledge of the charge.  James Tremby declared that the 
sheep were his own property, and that he bought them at different times 
off various individuals.  One verdict was returned of guilty against the 
Tremby's for receiving sheep knowing them to be stolen – 14 years to 
Newcastle.  Connor Shean was acquitted.   
 
In R v Smith and Ors, 1822, a witness lost a heifer in his charge.  While 
looking for the animal, he encountered one Smith with a shovel in his 
hand.  A deposition read:  
 
As soon as Smith left the spot, the witness went towards it, and 
found the hide of a beast only half covered; that he examined the 
same, and it turned out to be the skin of the very animal he was in 
quest of, having the brand M R  removed … for the ends of 
justice.  31 
 
Smith and accomplices were found guilty of stealing the heifer from one 
Mary Reiby and were remanded.32  In R v Reagan, 1823, Cornelius 
Regan was indicted for having in his possession a steer, the property of 
Mr James Badgery, knowing it to have been stolen.  Mr Badgery had 
stock in Argyleshire.  He was inspecting his cattle and to his surprise 
discovered a beast with a strange brand, but still was able to recognise 
the animal to be one of many that had been stolen from his stock.  
Although Regan told Badgery he had an explanation for the branding, 
the matter went to trial.  Counsel for the prisoner claimed Regan  
 
was entitled to an acquittal, inasmuch, that he was charged with 
having in his possession certain property knowing the same to 
have been stolen, whereas it had not yet been proved that the 
animal was actually stolen; and it was remarkable also, that the 
beast, said to be stolen, was found in Mr Badgery’s own stock. 33 
                                                
30 R v Tremby and Ors (1818) Decisions of the Superior Courts of NSW. 
31  R v Smith and Ors (1822): Decisions of the Superior Courts of NSW. 
32 Two of the prisoners Conden and Mullen were pardoned  in 1822. 
33 R v Reagan (1823): Decisions of the Superior Courts of NSW. 
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Despite evidence limited to the strange branding, the prisoner was 
adjudged guilty and sentenced to three years transportation.   
Receiving cattle under false pretences, where there was no form of 
branding on the animal, also often resulted in severe penalties for 
convicted prisoners.  In R v Brown, 1809 (No. 2) the accused claimed he 
lost some pigs and later found them in the possession of Thomas 
Kennedy.  The prisoner said he obtained them at the Hawkesbury.  It 
appeared afterwards that it was the prisoner at the Bar who 
impersonated Mr Kennedy – Mr Brown came and claimed the pigs, and 
they were delivered to him.  Brown was found guilty and received 500 
lashes.  In another deception case, R v McCabe and Ors, 1822, Edward 
McCabe and James Martin were indicted for obtaining 30 sheep, under 
false pretences, from the flock of Mrs Elizabeth Hassall of Parramatta.  
The prisoners took an order purporting to be signed by James Smithers, 
a Sydney butcher, for 30 sheep.  Most of the sheep were recovered and 
the felony was made out with both prisoners being sentenced to seven 
years transportation.   
On rare occasions, the records indicate that stealing cattle resulted in a 
death sentence.  In R v Haggerty and Ors, 1822, Michael Haggerty and 
Thomas Till were charged for sheep stealing; Joseph Cunningham and 
Samuel Medworth, for cattle stealing; Theophilus Chamberlain, for 
stealing a mare; William Brewer for stealing a colt; Dominick McIntyre, 
for sheep stealing; John Davis, for stealing a bullock; and James 
Francis, for stealing a cow and calf.   
His Honor took then into contemplation the similarity of crime 
(cattle and horses-stealing), upon which all the prisoners had been 
convicted; and to the youthful expressed a regret that so early 
they should be drawn into vices that might cut short their very 
existence at an untimely period; and to the elder criminals his 
remarks conveyed an awful picture of debasement which it was 
shuddering to listen to.  In the case of Cunningham who had 
produced on his own behalf an account of a considerable property 
he possessed (as an argument against the necessity of his falling 
into cattle-stealing), the Judge observed, that this want of 
necessity to go into crime, however little the plea of necessity 
itself could be admitted as it respected crime, stood as a proof 
against his moral inclination as strong as that which had appeared 
against his character in Court.  34 
 
                                                
34 R v Haggerty and Ors (1822): Decisions of the Superior Courts of NSW. 
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Judge Advocate Wylde mitigated the sentence of death to all of the 
prisoners at the bar to that of transportation for life to Newcastle, with 
the exception of Thomas Till who received fourteen years.  Joseph 
Risbey, Benjamin Risbey, and Patrick Murphy were not so fortunate in 
the Hobart trial R v Risbey and Ors, 1822.  The men were capitally 
charged, and convicted, with feloniously stealing upwards of 60 sheep, 
the property of a settler Mr Daniel Stanfield.   
  
The prisoners were of course asked what had become of them; 
upon which they said, that all were there, that were so on the 
Monday, except four or five, which they might have lost in 
driving home.  They, however, proceeded to examine the 
premises, and, in a hollow tree near the house, they found the 
skeletons of six sheep, covered with sheepskins; in other places 
they discovered another or so; the skeleton of a sheep with some 
mutton on it, was also found in the pig-stye, and about the 
premises quantity of bits of ears and heads of sheep.  35 
 d) Killing cattle 
Criminal cases involving the killing of the cattle were also firmly 
focussed on the loss suffered by the owner rather than the suffering of 
the animal.  Although the penalties in these cases could be particularly 
severe, there are examples in the trial records where the Criminal Court 
resisted conviction when there was a lack of substantiative evidence.  In 
R v Crane, 1822, Henry Crane was fully committed to trial for the 
“violent suspicion” of feloniously killing and carrying away a heifer.  36  
The owner of the heifer, Eleanor Welsh, deposed that her husband 
reported to her that the heifer had been killed in the calf pen and that 
“the carcass had been taken away, and the hide and entrails lying in the 
calf pen, the beast was about 14 months old”.  The prosecution claimed 
that a footprint left at the scene of the crime was that of the primary 
defendant Henry Crane.  Constable George Hoinbridge deposed “the 
prisoner on leaving the barn being mounted on one of the horses I 
observed that he had changed his shoes or drawn the nails out of those 
which he had on”.  The prisoners denied the charge, and with no further 
evidence being admitted, the Court acquitted all prisoners.   
The records suggest the courts were less tolerant when the owner of the 
stock was the Government.  In R v Donlan and Condron, 1809, a 
witness John Kennedy deposed that he received information that a 
sheep had been stolen.  Kennedy went to the Chief Constable at 
                                                
35 R v Risbey and Ors (1822): Decisions of the Superior Courts of NSW. 
36 With accomplices John Brian John Gregg, Thomas Pugh and Peter Fitzpatrick. 
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Parramatta to get him to search the hut where Pierce Condron was 
sleeping, and there he found the “fore quarters and the head”.  
Constable William Beaumont further deposed:  
 
He saw a sheep, and that Pierce Condron killed it, and cut the ears 
off, and that it belonged to government.  37 
 
The prisoners denied the charge and due to a lack of evidence were 
found not guilty.  Kennedy deposed that “William Davis brought it 
there, that he put the mutton into the cart and brought it into 
Parramatta.”  The Davis trial, heard on the same day, 38 concentrated on 
the Government’s ownership of the sheep and evidence suggesting 
Davis was seen carrying the sheep to Condron’s hut.  The prisoner 
claimed that he had found the sheep in the bush mangled by dogs, but 
John Curtis, a Government storekeeper, deposed “that a sheep was 
missing from the Stock belonging to Government, it did not appear to 
have been torn by the Native Dogs”.  On the basis of this evidence, 
Davis was found guilty and sentenced to death. 39   
   
Between 1788 and 1810, superior court records bare no resemblance to 
modern day law reports.  Records are mostly limited to minutes of 
proceedings, and explicit application of English precedent is rare to 
find; understandable given that for all but two years of this period the 
Judge Advocate position was held by former military officers with no 
legal training and armed with limited legal resources.  However, when 
Governor Macquarie and the highly trained Judge Advocate Ellis Bent 
arrived in the colony in 1810, in the aftermath of the Bligh coup, case 
law, particularly in the civil jurisdiction, begins to exhibit a greater 
degree of formality: citations of English cases and statutes and clearer 
judicial pronouncements of court procedure. 40   
 
In the 1817 trial of R v McFadden, William McFadden was indicted on 
a charge of feloniously killing and stealing a heifer in the district of the 
Nepean, the property of Donald Kennedy.  The case provides one of the 
earliest explicit pronouncements of the English law applicable to the 
stealing and felonious killing of animals.  The record states: 
 
                                                
37 R v Donlan and Codron (1809) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 415. 
38 R v Davis (No.  1) (1809).  Decisions of the Superior Courts of NSW. 
39 The Macnab Database records that although Davis was sentenced to death, he was not hanged: K. Macnab, Database, above n29.   
40 See for example R v McNaughton v Connors (1813) N.S.W.  Sel.  Cas.  (Kercher) 496.  This was more so in the civil jurisdiction 
that went through major amendments in 1814.  The Criminal Jurisdiction essentially maintained its military character 
throughout the 1788-1823 period.   
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The hide of the slaughtered animal was likewise found near the 
place where the prisoner had been discovered and apprehended, 
and was identified to be that of the heifer charged in the 
indictment.  This identity was however not material to the 
conviction, as by the statutes 14 and 15  Geo. II it is provided, 
that "if any person shall feloniously drive away, or in any other 
manner feloniously steal any ox, bull, cow, calf, steer, bullock, 
heifer, sheep, or lamb; or shall wilfully kill any such with a 
felonious intent to steal the whole carcass, or any part thereof; or 
shall assist or aid in committing any such offence, he shall be 
guilty of felony without benefit of clergy.  " 41 
 
The accused had to prove the heifer was bona fide his own property at 
the time of the killing.  Indeed, the case record provides further 
evidence that local regulation was prioritising ownership of the animal 
in relation to the right to kill: 
 
Under the operation of the proclamation issued by Government 
under date the 20th of May, 1812, which for the security of 
persons possessing stock of that description, renders … 
slaughtering highly penal, unless by persons duly licensed for the 
express purpose. 42 
 
The trial record does not show whether McFadden pleaded guilty or 
whether he claimed that he owned the heifer.  The prosecution led 
evidence that the prisoner was found near the dead heifer “creeping 
away from behind a rock upon his hands and knees, to avoid 
observation” and “several stains of blood” appeared on the prisoner’s 
jacket.  McFadden was found guilty.  The evidence suggests that the 
beast was shot, slaughtered and its remains left near McFadden’s house 
– all immaterial facts in terms of the eventual outcome of the case.   
 
In part 2 of this examination into some of Australia’s first cases 
involving animals, attention turns to the civil jurisdiction and a 
collection of critical cases that went to the core of British sovereignty.  
The court records in part 2 follow a similarly sobering tale to the trials 
considered above.  Part 2 will further explore the notion that although 
animals were central in the development of the law in the new colony, 
they were noticeably invisible in terms of their personal protection.   
_____________________
                                                
41 R v McFadden (1817): Decisions of the Superior Courts of NSW. 
42 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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Animals & the Trade Practices Act: 
The Return of Descartes’ Ghost 
 
 
Ven.  Alex Bruce *1 
 
Introduction 
French philosopher Rene Descartes thought animals were little 
more than inanimate objects without the capacity to think or feel pain.  
At the time, Descartes was influenced by the prevailing mechanistic 
conception of the natural world in which phenomena could be explained 
in simple mechanical terms.   
Descartes therefore believed the behaviour of animals did not need to be 
explained by theories of sentience and consciousness, but their 
behaviour could be explained by the simple mechanical functioning of 
their constituent parts: 
 
“that animals do better than humans do, does not prove that 
they are endowed with mind, for in this case, they would have 
more reason that any of us, and would surpass us in all other 
things.  It rather shows that they have no reason at all and that it 
is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their 
organs….  .  ”2 
 
The result is that, as Cottingham observes: 
 
“To be able to believe that a dog with a broken paw is not really 
in pain when it whimpers is quite an extraordinary achievement, 
even for a philosopher.  ”3 
 
Of course, animals and their interests were never the intended 
beneficiaries of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (“the Act”).  And, to 
my knowledge, no one has undertaken an evaluation of the Act 
according to Cartesian philosophy!  Nevertheless, the way in which the 
Act conceptualises animals, and the way in which the Act has been 
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employed in relation to animals and their interests suggests that 
Descartes’ ghost lingers on.   
 
This article examines the way in which the Act has been utilised by 
various litigants when the interests of those litigants have involved 
animals.  It suggests that the dominating philosophical influence of the 
Act is grounded in Cartesian principles, thus making no differentiation 
in principle or application between animals and other inanimate objects 
as economic goods.   
 
Accordingly, by examining selected cases, the article demonstrates how 
there is a fundamental conflict between the economic objectives of the 
Act in enhancing the welfare of Australians and the recognition of 
animals as sentient beings with interests that are deserving of 
recognition and protection.  This conflict is fundamental because the 
Act seeks to achieve the welfare of Australians through the promotion 
of competitive markets which in turn, are achieved through exploitative 
economic efficiencies.   
 
When animals are conceptualised as goods to be “efficiently marketed” 
their interests and welfare are subordinated to the pressures of the 
market.  Without a fundamental re-evaluation of how animals are 
conceptualised under the Act, the statutory object of enhancing the 
welfare of Australians will continue to be achieved by subordinating the 
welfare and interests of animals.   
 
 
The Object of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
 
When it was signed into law in October 1974, the Act was intended to 
be an anti-inflationary measure, designed to ensure that corporations did 
not employ various forms of market manipulation such as cartelisation 
to artificially raise and then maintain prices for goods or services above 
the competitive level.  4 
 
It wasn’t until the conclusion of the Hilmer Committee into National 
Competition Policy that in 1995 the Act was amended to include an 
objects clause.  Thus, section 2 now makes it clear that the object of the 
Act is to: 
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“enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of 
competition and fair trading and provision for consumer 
protection.  ” 
 
The High Court has given some indication of what this section means.  
Justice McHugh in the Boral decision stated: 
 
“The Parliament has determined that it is in the interests of 
consumers that firms be required to compete because 
competition results in lower prices, better goods and services 
and increased efficiency.  ”5 
 
However, competition is also quite ruthless and there is a grim 
economic “Darwinianism” at work in all capitalist economies.  Strong 
and efficient firms flourish, while weaker and inefficient firms exit the 
market.  Accordingly: 
 
“The purpose of the Act is to promote competition, not to 
protect the private interests of particular persons or corpor-
ations.  Competition damages competitors.  If the damage is 
sufficiently serious, competition may eliminate a competitor.”6 
 
This idea is reflected in those anti-competitive prohibitions that require 
conduct to meet a certain “threshold” before that conduct can be said to 
breach the Act.  Many forms of anti-competitive conduct will only 
breach the Act if there is evidence that the conduct has the effect or 
likely effect of “substantially lessening competition” in a defined 
market.  7  
 
Therefore, even if a single firm is eliminated by conduct such as an 
exclusive dealing arrangement, the Act will not be breached unless that 
conduct substantially lessens competition in the market as a whole. 8  
Thus, the Full Court of the Federal Court in ASX Operations Pty Ltd v 
Pont Data Australia (No 2) stated: 
 
“In asking whether provisions of the agreement have or would 
have or would be likely to have the effect…of substantially 
lessening competition…one looks not so much as the position 
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of particular competitors as to the state or condition constituting 
the market or markets in question, actually and potentially.”9 
 
The welfare of Australians is therefore believed to be increased by the 
efficient and competitive functioning of the market as a whole and not 
necessarily the competitive health of any single individual competitor.   
 
The Welfare of Australians, Not Animals 
 
If the Act is not intended to benefit individual firms struggling in the 
market, then it is even less likely that the Act will be interpreted in a 
way that will benefit animals and their interests.  In fact, the cases 
demonstrate that enhancing the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of effective and efficient competition is in opposition to the 
welfare of animals.   
 
Reflecting the Cartesian understanding of animals as non-sentient 
automata10, section 4 of Act specifically defines animals as “goods”; 
conceptualising them in the same way that non-sentient objects such as 
ships, vehicles, trees and minerals are conceptualised.   
 
Since they are defined as goods by the Act, animals are largely viewed 
as “units of production” within the larger corporate enterprise, to be 
manipulated as cost-efficiently as possible.  And since competition law 
is predicated on the attainment of productive, allocative and 
“x-efficiencies”, there is little room for the a-priori recognition of 
animals as sentient beings that have physical and emotional needs and 
can feel pain.   
 
Thus; 
 
“we believe we can be most efficient by not being emotional.  
We are a business, not a humane society, and our job is to sell 
merchandise at a profit.  It’s no different from selling paper-
clips or refrigerators.”11 
 
Animals and their interests are largely considered as incidental to the 
economic policy objectives of the Act which has rarely been employed 
to recognise or protect the interests of animals.  For the most part, 
litigation under the Act has involved the protection of corporate 
interests and those of consumers.   
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Where a firm’s production involves animals or animal products the 
suffering of those animals is relevant only in so far as that suffering 
causes economic loss.  In this way the Act has been used by those firms 
to prevent economic injury being inflicted through boycotts or other 
anti-competitive practices.   
 
However, while animals may not have directly benefited, animals and 
their interests have played an important role in the development of the 
Act as a law.  Since the Act’s early days, cases involving animals have 
contributed to the development of trade practices jurisprudence.  These 
cases are discussed below and demonstrate how the economic interests 
of litigants come into conflict with animal interests.   
 
 
The Trade Practices Act at Work 
 
Broadly speaking, the Act can be conceptually divided into two parts; 
firstly, those sections that prohibit a variety of anti-competitive conduct 
and secondly, those sections that provide for consumer protection by 
prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct, false representations and 
providing for actions in respect of unsuitable or unsafe consumer goods 
or services.   
 
Part IV of the Act prohibits anti-competitive practices such as 
horizontal and vertical price fixing, misuse of market power, exclusive 
dealing, primary and secondary boycotts and anti-competitive mergers 
and acquisitions.  Parts IVA, V and VA of the Act prohibit misleading 
and deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct, imply terms into 
consumer contracts and provide for causes of action in respect of unsafe 
goods or services.   
 
Market Definition 
 
Anti-competitive conduct is said to diminish the welfare of consumers 
because it distorts the efficient operation of “the market”.  However 
many of the prohibitions in part IV of the Act only prohibit conduct if 
that conduct “substantially lessens competition” within a defined 
market.  Thus market definition is the crucial first step in evaluating the 
lawfulness of allegedly anti-competitive conduct.   
 
Markets have several dimensions, including product, geographic, 
functional and temporal dimensions.  Each of these dimensions of the 
market have been considered and explained by the courts and several 
important cases represent the locus classicus of relevant principles.   
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In relation to the principles involved with geographic market definition 
the decision of the Full Federal Court in Australia Meat Holdings Pty 
Limited v Trade Practices Commission
12 is often referred to.   
 
Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (“AMH”) owned a number of abattoirs 
in North Queensland.  It purchased cattle from local cattle farmers for 
slaughter and processing at those abattoirs.  It acquired all the issued 
share capital in Thomas Borthwicks & Sons (Australasia) Ltd which 
also owned and operated abattoirs in the Northern Queensland towns of 
Bowen and Mackay.   
 
The Trade Practices Commission (“the TPC”) sought an injunction 
alleging that the acquisition would result in competition being lessened 
in “the market” in breach of s50 of the Act.   
 
The TPC was concerned that, once it had control over the abattoirs in 
North Queensland, AMH would be in a position to dictate pricing and 
trade terms to the cattle farmers in North Queensland, without being 
constrained by the competition previously offered by the Borthwick 
abattoirs.  The TPC advanced a market definition described as the 
“Northern Queensland fat cattle market”.   
 
Tactically, AMH countered this argument by arguing for a wide market 
definition that included the entire State of Queensland.  In this way 
AMH argued that its acquisition of the Borthwick abattoirs would not 
inhibit competition because cattle farmers could send their cattle for 
processing to other privately-owned abattoirs in South Queensland.   
 
Resolution of this issue turned on evidence of the cattle farmers about 
the suffering experienced by cattle in the process of transporting them to 
abattoirs.  Evidence indicated that during transport, cattle lost weight 
and bruised easily.  The farmers were not concerned about this suffering 
per se, but rather about its economic effect.  The abattoirs paid the 
farmers based on “clean dressed weight”.  Farmers were not paid as 
much for cattle that had lost weight and whose flesh was bruised.   
 
Accordingly, the evidence was that if AMH controlled the abattoirs in 
North Queensland and increased the price of their services, farmers 
would not send cattle for slaughter and processing to abattoirs in South 
Queensland because the increased bruising and weight loss suffered by 
the cattle would result in a much lower sale price.  Based on this 
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evidence, the relevant geographic market was correctly defined to be the 
“North Queensland fat cattle market.  ” 
 
During the trial, the Full Court examined extensive evidence concerning 
the suffering experienced by the cattle.  This harm to the cattle 
demonstrated by this evidence was crucial to the Court’s eventual 
decision concerning market definition.  However, the evidence of 
suffering was not considered from the context of the interests of the 
animals themselves.   
 
The suffering was relevant because it diminished the economic value of 
the cattle as goods to be sold.  Only because the farmers lost money per 
“unit of product” during transportation to South Queensland was the 
relevant market confined to North Queensland. 13 
 
Secondary Boycotts 
 
The AMIEU Cases 
 
While many people may not have heard about the Act, they have heard 
about “secondary boycotts”.  That phrase carries a certain emotional 
weight in a country like Australia which is dependent on the efficient 
and valuable functioning of its primary industries.  Words like “the 
ACTU”, “union thuggery”, “scab workers” and “picket lines” are also 
associated with secondary boycotts.  It is an emotive and volatile issue.   
 
Since 1977, the Act has included provisions prohibiting the making of 
and the giving effect to secondary boycotts, principally initiated by 
trade unions and their member workers, directed at preventing a third 
party (such as a supplier, contractor or some intermediate service 
provider) from providing services to the “target” fourth party, usually a 
manufacturer.  Accordingly, a secondary boycott occurs: 
 
“when the parties prevent third parties from dealing with the 
target.  The third party becomes the means by which 
competition is adversely affected in a market in which the 
targeted fourth party competes.  ”14 
 
Since 1977, many cases concerning the secondary boycott provisions 
have involved animal industries.  In particular, the Australasian Meat 
Industry Employee’s Union (“the AMIEU”) has been associated with 
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secondary boycott activity against Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd15, 
Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd16 and with the Meat and Allied Trades 
Association of Australia. 17 
 
None of these cases involved advancing the interests of animals.  None 
of the parties to the secondary boycott was motivated by concern for 
animals being slaughtered and processed.  The AMIEU was concerned 
with workers’ conditions in abattoirs and other meat processing plants.   
 
The Act was therefore used by the relevant corporations to “break” the 
boycotts in order to continue trading.  Protection of income streams 
derived from the slaughter and processing of animals was the primary 
reason for instituting the action.   
 
When Free Speech becomes a Breach of the Trade Practices Act 
 
Justice Kirby in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game 
Meats said: 
 
“The concerns of a governmental and political character must 
not be narrowly confined.  To do so would be to restrict or 
inhibit the operation of the representative democracy that is 
envisaged by the Constitution.  Within that democracy, 
concerns about animal welfare are clearly legitimate matters of 
public debate across the nation.  So are concerns about the 
export of animals and animal products.  Many advances in 
animal welfare have occurred only because of public debate and 
political pressure from special interest groups.  The activities of 
such groups have sometimes pricked the conscience of human 
beings.”18 
 
However, it is sometimes a fine line between “public debate and 
political pressure from interests groups” on one hand, and conduct that 
breaches the Act on the other.  The use of secondary boycott tactics for 
the express intention of benefiting animals and their interests occurred 
in 2005 when it was alleged that the animal activist group “People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals” (“PETA”) and others, had targeted 
the Australian Wool Innovation (“the AWI”) on behalf of Australian 
woolgrowers’ practice of mulesing sheep.   
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The wool around a sheep’s backside accumulates urine and faeces.  
That accumulation is a breeding ground for blowflies that lay their eggs 
in the matted area.  When the maggots hatch, they burrow under the 
sheep’s skin and begin to feed on them.  Mulesing is a procedure in 
which part of the sheep’s posterior area is cut off, thus creating a bald 
area where wool does not grow.  No anaesthetic is used during the 
procedure and the sheep scream in pain as it is partially skinned alive.   
 
The AWI alleged that PETA and others had implemented an 
“Australian wool boycott” to stop the overseas sale of wool produced in 
Australia.  It was alleged that PETA and others had used intimidatory 
tactics against retailers of woollen clothes to prevent those retailers 
from buying goods from manufacturers using Australian wool.   
 
At the time, the case attracted considerable interest in Australia and 
internationally.  The NSW Council for Civil Liberties issued a media 
release stating (inter alia): 
 
“This is clearly legitimate political protest action, whether you 
agree or disagree with their cause.  It really is an outrage that 
the Trade Practices Act is being misused in this manner.  This is 
clearly not what the secondary boycott provisions were 
designed for.  Animal welfare groups, or any other interested 
party must be able to organise a political boycott without fear of 
court intervention.”19 
 
Initially the Court struck out the AWI’s Statement of Claim, holding 
that it had not pleaded the secondary boycott argument correctly.  20  
However, the court also granted the AWI leave to re-plead, which it 
promptly did.   
 
It is interesting to read the press statement of then Chairman of the 
AWI, Ian McLauchlan, rebutting PETA’s concerns with mulesing.  Mr 
McLauchlan said the AWI would: “do whatever is necessary to protect 
and uphold the reputation of the fibre and the way it is produced.”21 
 
The emphasis was not on the protection of the sheep so much as the 
protection of the reputation of the product harvested from the sheep.  
The welfare of the sheep was relevant only insofar as that welfare 
influenced the economic benefits associated with wool production.   
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In June 2007, after three years of litigation, PETA and the AWI reached 
a mediated resolution to the dispute.  Each side quickly claimed victory 
as the spin-campaign to win over public support started.   
 
AWI claimed to have “won a landmark commitment from PETA to stop 
threatening global retailers over the practice of mulesing until 
December 2010 ”22  PETA claimed that “animal abusers sue PETA at 
their peril.”23 
 
The Empire Strikes Back 
 
Meanwhile, the (Prime Minister John) Howard Government progressed 
with its agenda to amend the Act so that Australian industries could 
more effectively use the secondary boycott provisions to prevent 
protests.   
 
Introducing the Trade Practices Amendment (Small Business 
Protection) Bill 2007, (“the Bill”), the Treasurer, Mr Peter Costello, 
stated: 
 
“The Government is going to amend the Trade Practices Act so 
that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission can 
take representative actions – that it can take an action on behalf 
of all Australian farmers if somebody tries to boycott their 
wool.  An example of this has recently been the group which is 
trying to organise a boycott of Australian wool because it is 
protesting about mulesing.”24 
 
The Senate Economics Committee that had been tasked with reviewing 
the Bill, received several submissions concerning the potential chilling 
effect the amendments might have on legitimate political protests 
generally, and animal welfare issues particularly.  Journalist David Marr 
wrote that: 
 
“So if you’re asking Australians not to buy lipstick tested on 
caged rabbits, rugs woven by Pakistani slaves or suits made 
with mulesed wool, then pray your boycott calls don’t succeed, 
for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is 
about to be given the power to sue you out of the water if they 
do … no free-speech defence is immediately available.  You 
won’t be able to go to court to plead the pros and cons of open-
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range chooks or gentler methods than mulesing to save sheep 
from fly strike.”25 
 
The Bill lapsed following the election loss of the Howard Liberal 
Government in November 2007.  The (Prime Minister Kevin) Rudd 
Labor Government did not re-introduce the Bill.   
 
Perhaps one reason for not doing so was the decision of the Full Federal 
Court in Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser26 in 
which a live sheep exporter successfully established a breach of the 
secondary boycott provisions of the Act.   
 
If other animal producers could use the reasoning in Hahnheuser then 
there would be no need for the amendment.   
 
Hahnheuser & the Trade Practices Act 
 
At about the time PETA was agitating the mulesing litigation, Mr Ralph 
Hahnheuser and his friends broke into a sheep feed lot in Victoria.  The 
sheep were to be exported to the Middle East for slaughter according to 
Islamic Halal requirements which demand that an animal be conscious 
when it is slaughtered; by having its throat cut.   
 
The animal then bleeds to death often while hanging upside down.  
However, Islamic dietary requirements also prohibit the ingestion of 
foods involving swine or pork and its by-products.   
 
Mr Hahnheuser sought to protest against this practice of slaughter by 
introducing a ham and water mixture into several feed troughs which 
fed almost 2000 sheep.  The desired effect was that the sheep would be 
regarded as “contaminated” as not meeting Halal requirements.   
 
The case was instituted by a company, Rural Export & Trading (WA) 
Pty Ltd (“Rural”), alleging it had suffered loss and damage because 
Hahnheuser’s conduct breached section 45DB of the Act.  That section 
provides: 
 
“A person must not, in concert with another person, engage in 
conduct for the purpose, and having or likely to have the effect 
of preventing or substantially hindering a third person (who is 
not an employer of the first person) from engaging in trade or 
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commerce involving the movement of goods between Australia 
and places outside of Australia.  ” 
 
However, the facts were complicated because Rural was not actually 
exporting the sheep.  Another company, Samex Australian Meat Co Pty 
Ltd (“Samex”), had purchased the sheep and was exporting them to the 
Middle East for yet another corporation, Livestock Transport and 
Trading (“LTT”), which was owned by the Government of Kuwait.  
Rural was a wholly owned subsidiary of LTT and Samex was using 
sheep feed lots managed by Rural.   
 
The directors of Samex thought Rural was its customer (erroneously 
equating Rural with LTT) when in fact Samex was Rural’s customer.  
The directors of those companies apparently did not understand who 
was a customer of whom.27  Accordingly, at first instance, the Court 
found it was not Rural who had suffered any loss or damage under the 
Act, but that it was Samex.  Rural was thus found not to be entitled to 
any damages.  28 
 
After sorting through the trading relationship between the companies, 
the court found that Hahnheuser’s conduct had in fact interfered with 
Samex’s trade.   
 
However, it also found that Hahnheuser could rely on a defence 
provided by s45DD that states: 
 
“A person does not contravene, and is not involved in a 
contravention of … s45DB(1) by engaging in conduct if: 
 
(a) the dominant purpose for which the conduct is 
engaged in is substantially related to environmental 
protection or consumer protection.” 
 
Justice Gray concluded that the phrase “environmental protection” as it 
appears in s45DB(1): 
 
“comprehends living things, including animals, and the 
conditions under which they live.  No reason appears for 
drawing any distinction between animals that are bred to be 
farming stock, to be slaughtered for the production of food for 
humans and other animals.  There is no reason why the 
protection of the conditions in which farm animals are kept 
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28 Ibid. 
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should be excluded from the concept of environmental 
protection.”29 
 
Justice Gray’s conclusion was reached after an examination of the 
Senate Debates associated with the introduction of the amendments and 
in which the term “environment” was considered to have its ordinary 
and not restricted meaning.  30 
 
The Full Court upheld an appeal by Rural and Samex and reversed the 
decision at first instance.  The Full Court remitted the matter back to the 
trial judge for determining the issue of damages for Samex and, 
derivatively for Rural.   
 
Essentially, after failing to find a dictionary definition of 
“environmental protection”, the Full Court disaggregated the two words 
and found dictionary definitions for each.  It then joined those separate 
definitions to reach what it considered to be an appropriate definition of 
the aggregated concept.  That definition was quite narrow: 
 
“The ‘environment’ referred to in the expression ordinarily will 
be a particular location, thing or habitat in which a particular 
individual instance or aggregation of flora or fauna or artifice 
exists.  And the ‘protection’ is to preserve the existence and or 
characteristics of that environment being that location, thing or 
habitat.”31 
 
The Full Court concluded that Mr Hahnheuser did not have the 
dominant purpose of protection the sheep from the environment of their 
paddock, but was attempting to protect them from the conditions 
experienced aboard the ship.  For this reason, the Full Court concluded 
that his activity did not relate to environmental protection.  32 
 
It is interesting that one of the members of the Full Court was now 
Chief Justice French of the High Court of Australia.   
 
Primary Boycotts – Exclusionary Provisions 
 
A similar emphasis on animal suffering only in so far as that suffering 
creates economic difficulties for another party is evidenced in the 
primary boycott cases.   
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In McCarthy v Australian Rough Riders Association Inc33 the court was 
asked to award an interlocutory injunction restraining the Australian 
Rough Riders Association Inc (“the ARRA”) from enforcing what was 
argued to be an exclusionary provision.  McCarthy and three other 
rodeo riders were successful and talented members of the ARRA.  In 
order to increase their income, McCarthy and the others decided to join 
and then compete in non-ARRA sponsored rodeo competitions.   
 
The ARRA Rules included one permitting it to exclude rodeo riders 
who had participated in non-ARRA events from competing in ARRA 
rodeo.  In late 1987, the ARRA informed its member clubs that, 
pursuant to this rule, McCarthy was not eligible to participate in ARRA 
events because he had joined and participated in non-ARRA rodeos.  
The ARRA also attempted to impose a fine of $3000 and require 
McCarthy to accept a 12-month “good behaviour bond” as a 
precondition to participating in ARRA rodeos. 34 
 
The court had little difficulty in finding the existence of an exclusionary 
provision as defined in s4D of the Act.  While the ARRA was not in 
competition with its member clubs, the clubs themselves were 
competitive with each other for the acquisition of rodeo riders whose 
services were considered to be that of an entertainer. 35 
 
The evil which the Act’s exclusionary provisions seek to eliminate is 
economic harm to the “target” of the boycott.  The interests of the 
animals were not an issue.  What mattered was that McCarthy and the 
other riders were being prevented from earning an income because the 
ARRA and its member clubs were boycotting the acquisition of 
McCarthy’s “entertainment” services.   
 
Consumer Protection 
 
The consumer protection provisions of the Act have also been used by 
corporations against animal welfare organisations.  In Orion Pet 
Products Pty Limited v RSPCA (VIC)36 the RSPCA was alleged to have 
engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s52 of the 
Act in criticising electronic dog collars.   
 
Section 52 of the Act simply provides: 
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“A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in 
conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or 
deceive.  ” 
 
Orion Pet Products Pty Limited (“Orion”) manufactured and sold 
electronic dog collars that were used for discipline and training.  The 
RSPCA (VIC) had been campaigning for the banning of such collars in 
Victoria.  In support of its campaign, the RSPCA published various 
materials alleging that the collars produced a 3000 volt shock and 
caused burning, shock, vomiting and severe distress to animals.   
 
Rather than addressing these issues, Orion sued RSPCA, seeking 
damages as well as orders preventing it from campaigning against the 
collars.  Again, the emphasis of the applicant’s case was not the 
suffering caused to the dogs, but the extent to which the conduct of the 
RSPCA might cause pet owners to stop buying collars thus depriving it 
of an income stream.   
 
Ultimately the case failed and Orion did not obtain the orders it sought.   
 
The case failed because the court held that the RSPCA’s conduct was 
not “in trade or commerce” as required by s52.  This was a crucial 
finding.  For some years, the High Court had been attempting to tighten 
the scope of s52 of the Act.  In Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v 
Nelson
37 the Court drew a distinction between commercial conduct that 
was in trade or commerce on the one hand and commercial conduct in 
connection with trade and commerce on the other.   
 
Only conduct that was “in trade or commerce” fell within the scope of 
s52 of the Act.  Conduct which is “in trade or commerce” refers: 
 
“only to conduct which is itself an aspect or element of 
activities of transactions which, of their nature, bear a trading or 
commercial character.”38 
 
The court found that the representations about the collars were made by 
the RSPCA as part of an educational and political campaign to have the 
electronic collars banned in Victoria.  Any connection with the 
RSPCA’s core commercial activities was therefore considered too 
tenuous to support a cause of action under s52.  39 
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It would be interesting to speculate on how the Full Court’s Hahnheuser 
decision might impact on these tactics.  If the RSPCA engaged in 
conduct designed to influence manufacturers of the components of the 
collars to stop supplying them to the manufacturer, or influenced pet 
stores or other parties from acquiring the completed electronic dog 
collars, would they be exposed to action under the secondary boycott 
provisions of the Act? 
 
Unlike s52 of the Act, the secondary boycott provisions do not require 
that the conduct alleged to constitute a breach to be “in trade or 
commerce”, which the High Court has attempted to constrain by 
limiting the application of the section to conduct which of itself bears a 
trading or commercial character.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is specifically intended to enhance 
the welfare of Australians.  It does this through prohibiting various 
forms of anti-competitive and misleading conduct.  However, the 
“welfare” to Australian consumers is predicated on the assumption that 
competitive markers will produce such benefits.  In turn, competitive 
markets are markets in which corporations display productive, 
allocative and “x-efficiencies” in the use of goods and services.   
 
As this discussion of case law demonstrates, market-based efficiencies 
have been generated at the expense of animals and their interests, 
establishing a fundamental conflict between the welfare of Australian 
consumer and the welfare of animals.   
 
Consistent with Cartesian philosophical principles, the Act characterises 
animals as goods that simply form part of corporate assets.  Since they 
are defined as goods by the Act, animals are largely viewed as “units of 
production” within the larger corporate enterprise, to be manipulated as 
cost-efficiently as possible.   
 
Without a fundamental re-evaluation of how animals are conceptualised 
under the Act, viz, as goods to be “efficiently marketed”, their interests 
and welfare will continue to be subordinated to market pressures in 
pursuit of the statutory object of enhancing the welfare of Australians.   
_____________________ 
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“Advancing Animal Welfare 
Laws in Hong Kong” 
 
Amanda Whitfort * 1 
 
Overview 
The Hong Kong government has recently committed to 
updating animal welfare laws in the jurisdiction.  Much of the current 
legislation, which was drafted in the 1930’s, is in urgent need of 
reconsideration in the light of current societal attitudes supporting 
animal welfare and growing concern for containment of animal related 
disease.  In 2007 an online survey conducted by local activist group 
“Animal Earth” polled 3,253 Hong Kong residents and found that 97.  
4% of respondents agreed people who dumped their pets should be 
punished and 94% said the current penalties for cruelty to animals were 
too lenient.2  This was despite the maximum penalty for cruelty being 
raised to a fine of HK$200,000 and a maximum of three years 
imprisonment, only the year before.  Accordingly, government has been 
forced to respond to increasing public concern as to the adequacy of 
legislation available to address cases of cruelty to animals and review 
the laws.3  
The review period commenced at the end of 2007 and was originally 
intended to take one year.  The government department responsible for 
animal welfare in Hong Kong, The Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Conservation Department (“AFCD”) set up a consultative group to 
begin to review the laws and reported its preliminary proposals on 19 
February 2008 to the Administration.4  However, matters raised by 
members of the Legislative Council during a motion debate held on 16 
January 20085  highlighted a number of issues which have yet to be 
addressed adequately by the AFCD and which are not currently the 
subject of the AFCD’s proposals for law reform.  Whilst legislative 
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change on the back of the AFCD’s review is yet to be implemented the 
proposals currently on the table do not address many of the problems 
faced in protecting the welfare of animals in Hong Kong and, at this 
time, a comprehensive review of animal welfare legislation in Hong 
Kong is still outstanding.   
 
There are several ordinances affecting the welfare of animals in Hong 
Kong.  The primary legislation is the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
Ordinance, Cap 169, of the Laws of Hong Kong, which includes 
subsidiary regulations detailing how captive animals should be treated, 
confined and transported.  The Ordinance provides a general prohibition 
against cruelty to animals and punishment for acts of cruelty. 6  Some 
further protection for domestic animals is provided in the Public Health 
(Animals and Birds) Regulations, Cap 139B, which regulates the trade 
in pets.  The Dogs and Cats Regulations, Cap 167A, prohibit the 
slaughter of dogs and cats for food, and a recent decision of the Court of 
Final Appeal provides that the appropriate punishment for slaughtering 
dogs should be a term of imprisonment.7  Under the Rabies Ordinance, 
Cap 421, it is an offence to abandon an animal,8 although prosecutions 
for this offence are unheard of in Hong Kong courts, as the prosecution 
finds it too difficult to prove intent.   
 
The general offence of cruelty to animals is provided in section 3(1)(a) 
of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Ordinance.  The Ordinance 
applies to all mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish or other 
vertebrate or invertebrate, whether wild or tame.  Whilst it appears 
somewhat progressive for invertebrates to be protected under the law 
the reality remains that prosecutions for cruelty offences are not 
initiated for this category of animals and their inclusion remains moot.   
 
The test for liability under the Ordinance requires that, generally, there 
is no need for the prosecution to establish that the alleged offender 
intended cruelty, his conduct will be judged according to the standards 
of a reasonable person in the same situation.  However, causation of 
unnecessary pain and suffering to the animal must be proved.  At law 
any suffering is sufficient to establish pain. 9  
 
On conviction, the Ordinance provides the power, where necessary, to 
remove animals from their owners where the animal is at risk of further 
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cruelty.10  On conviction, magistrates may remove animals from their 
legal keepers and require that the animal is given such necessary 
treatment and care, at the expense of the owner, as is required for its 
recovery.11  Any person who acts in contravention of such an order may 
be fined up to $200,000 and imprisoned for three years.12 
 
The Ordinance also provides that animals kept in confinement or 
captivity, or in the course of transport, must be provided with sufficient 
food and constant fresh water.  The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
Regulations further provide that animals kept in captivity must have 
adequate shelter from sun/rain, clean, well ventilated and safe places of 
confinement, free movement, and protection from injury and disease.   
 
Prosecution  
 
Whilst it may appear that the laws protecting animals in Hong Kong are 
adequate, in practice one of the major difficulties in pursuing 
prosecutions for animal cruelty is the categorizing of animal welfare 
legislation as criminal law. This necessarily requires that any 
prosecution must establish that the defendant’s actions were cruel, 
beyond any reasonable doubt.  Meeting the criminal standard naturally 
sets a high level of due process protection for the offender, particularly 
in the current pro-defendant common law climate.  This problem is not 
Hong Kong specific.  In New Zealand, offenders have commenced 
challenging evidence on the basis of alleged human rights abuses by 
SPCA inspectorate.  13  
 
Elsewhere there has been some move towards a regulatory structure for 
enforcement of animal welfare laws, rather than criminal, resulting in 
what may provide a more effective regime.  Where offences are judged 
on a strict liability basis the problem of establishing mens rea can 
obviously be avoided.  With this end in mind, a regulatory regime for 
animal cruelty prosecutions is currently being considered in 
Switzerland, New Zealand and parts of Canada, including Quebec. 14  
 
The introduction of a regulatory regime allows the significant 
distinction to be drawn between matters of animal welfare and animal 
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cruelty.  As noted by Bloom,15 breaches of standards should not 
necessarily expose the offender to criminal liability, where an 
administrative response would better serve the interests of animal 
welfare.  Where criminal sanctions follow failures to meet minimum 
standards, the natural inclination of those drafting the legislation is to 
develop and impose standards that are eminently reachable.  There is no 
incentive to raise the bar.   
 
As stated, on conviction in Hong Kong a magistrate may order the 
removal of an animal if it is at risk of further cruelty.  An offender may 
be ordered to pay the costs of maintenance and treatment for the animal.  
However the devil, as always, is in the detail.  A loophole in the 
legislation currently exists whereby the offender may, at any stage, 
demand the destruction of the animal to avoid paying the maintenance 
fees.16  This power is consistent with the common law assumption that 
as an animal is the property of the owner, it may be killed at his behest.   
 
Food Animals 
   
Animals kept in captivity and undergoing transport in Hong Kong are 
required under the law to be provided with constant access to clean 
water, adequate food, and shelter.17  However, the routine treatment of 
animals held in live food markets and en route to slaughterhouses belies 
these legal safeguards.   
 
Most of Hong Kong’s meat supply is transported live from the mainland 
on trucks and special railroad carriage trains, to wet markets and 
slaughterhouses in Hong Kong.  Hong Kong has nearly phased out all 
live stock farming in the Territory so relies on China’s inland provinces, 
in particular Sichuan, to supply pigs.  Many animals transported over 
long distances through China receive limited supply of food and water.  
In China there is no legislation protecting either food or companion 
animals from cruelty.  The only animal welfare law enacted in China 
relates to endangered species.  Where water is supplied to animals in 
transport, it is commonplace for cattle to be force fed with water by 
having a hose passed down the oesophagus to fill the stomach.  
Unfortunately Hong Kong regulations on the proper transport of 
animals can only be enforced after the animals have crossed the border.   
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In the case of poultry, repeated outbreaks of Avian flu have left the 
government with no option but to move to centralized slaughter of 
chickens.  This proposal has not been supported by the Hong Kong 
public as it will effectively bring to an end to the common practice of 
buying live birds at wet markets. 18  Wet markets are essentially live 
food markets.  The storage and handling of live chickens in wet markets 
is not only a welfare concern but has obvious disease implications.  
Chickens are routinely crammed together in crates, packed and placed 
one on top of another.  When a bird is bought by a customer, it is 
slaughtered by exsanguination without stunning.  This practice whilst 
overtly cruel, maintains Chinese custom which holds that an animal 
should not be beheaded at death, as heads signify a good beginning and 
a good end.  As such, despite the legal precedent that where a person 
begins to kill an animal he must kill it outright,19no enforcement action 
is taken against poultry vendors.   
 
Whilst fish are included in the definition of ‘animal’ under the 
Ordinance, there are no regulations in place to curb cruelty practised on 
fish sold in wet markets.  Wet markets selling live seafood are common 
in Hong Kong and may be found on the street or even inside large 
supermarket chains.  It is common practice in wet markets for fish 
confined in small tanks or buckets to be removed and placed on the 
chopping block to “flip” for the customer to display their freshness.  
Frogs and crabs are routinely tied up (frogs in bunches of 3 or 4) and 
stacked on top of one another in boxes to await purchase.  To date no 
legal challenges have been made to wet market practices despite the 
apparent “unnecessary suffering” caused to these animals and their 
inclusion under the legal definition of “animal” found in Cap 169.  The 
Public Health (Animals and Birds) Ordinance provides no regulations 
on humane slaughter methods.   
 
Animal welfare issues, such as these, are often overlooked by the public 
and the media which has routinely focused on isolated incidents of 
cruelty to domestic animals.  However, if Hong Kong’s animal welfare 
laws are to be updated to meet even the basic standards set in 
comparable jurisdictions, updated research is required to evaluate all 
local legislation affecting animal welfare, not just the overt cruelty laws.   
 
In the Chief Executive of Hong Kong’s 2006-2007 Policy Address, the 
government committed to reviewing the regulatory framework for 
poultry and animals for the purpose of enhancing public health and food 
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safety.20  Outside of Hong Kong the link between animal welfare and 
public health has been clearly established. 21  Within Hong Kong the 
link has been less considered and animal welfare laws could be better 
utilised to promote the health of food animals, in turn benefiting public 
health.  To this end Hong Kong’s Public Health Ordinance and AFCD 
Codes would benefit from critical evaluation and overhaul.   
 
Pet Ownership 
 
The Public Health (Animals and Birds) Ordinance currently regulates 
the welfare of animals kept by pet shop traders and breeders, however 
the Ordinance is deficient in failing to include any definition of welfare 
standards.   
 
Currently the law provides no minimum age for breeding nor cap on the 
number of litters a bitch may produce per year.  In the face of pressure 
from welfare groups, the government has recently suggested that the 
introduction of a two bitch maximum for any licensed breeder22 
However, the reality of Hong Kong living arrangements, where 
registration of dogs may be spread over huge extended families, ensures 
there can be no effective enforcement of this cap.   
 
In Hong Kong the law currently allows so called “hobby breeders” to 
trade in animals whilst avoiding tax, business registration and licensing 
conditions, including inspection of their premises and animals by the 
AFCD.  Thousands of unlicensed puppy mill operations are spread 
across the northern part of Hong Kong, the New Territories, and the 
proposed changes to the laws are unlikely to alter this position.  The 
government has refused to close a loophole in the law which allows 
unlicensed breeders to continue to trade without government 
intervention as long as they define themselves as ‘hobby breeders’.   
 
Cross-border smuggling of puppies from China, where health 
conditions are poor also spreads disease to Hong Kong.  Whilst rabies 
has been controlled in Hong Kong for a decade there is a real fear that 
the disease may be brought in from the mainland.  In a recent case a 
huge number of very young puppies were detected after having been 
smuggled into Hong Kong.  All were immediately euthanized, despite 
                                                
20 Hong Kong Government Policy Address 2006-2007 at p 40. 
21 The OIE has highlighted the need for all countries to invest in better animal welfare systems to protect themselves from natural or 
bioterrorist threats linked to the reintroduction of infectious animal diseases and zoonoses that they have already succeeded in 
eliminating, but also to safeguard public health. 
22 “Draft Additional Conditions attached to the Animal Traders Licence”, paragraph f(iii), issued under section 5(3) of the Public 
Health (Animals and Birds) (Animal Traders) Regulations Cap 139B, Laws of Hong Kong. 
[2009] 2 AAPLJ 71  
not having been tested for any disease, to ensure any potential risk was 
contained.   
 
Pet owners also face difficulties in keeping their pets in the high density 
living arrangement common to Hong Kong.  Dogs have been banned in 
public housing since 2003. 23  The SARS epidemic did not help matters 
as many people took the view that animals were spreading the disease.  
In recent years there has been a spate of challenges to the keeping of 
dogs as pets in private housing as well.  A significant number of 
management companies have sought to oust dogs by enforcing new 
‘House Rules’, determined by the building Owners Committee, which 
ban the keeping of pets.  Once the House rules are changed pet owners 
face extreme pressure to get rid of their animals or face prosecution by 
the Owners’ Committee.   
 
Last June a dog owner challenged his Owners Committee’s ruling in the 
District Court. 24  In multi apartment housing the House rules are 
determined by the Incorporated Owners Committee and enforced by the 
Management Committee but they take their legal enforceability from 
the Deed of Mutual Covenant.  It is the Deed of Mutual Covenant which 
all owners must sign when they purchase or rent their apartment.  In the 
case against the Incorporated Owners of Mei Foo the owner argued that 
as the Deed itself did not prohibit the keeping of pets, the House Rules 
could not be amended to prohibit them, despite the majority of owners 
voting to change the House rules.  The District Court agreed and found 
that as House rules are subsidiary to the Deed of Mutual Covenant they 
cannot be altered to conflict with the original Deed.  The judge stated: 
‘The DMC guaranteed owners the full right and privilege to the 
exclusive occupation and enjoyment of their unit…keeping a pet in 
one’s premises is within the right and privilege of the owner/occupant in 
enjoying his premises.  ’.25 
 
Stray Animals 
 
Under the Rabies Ordinance, Cap 421, it is an offence to abandon an 
animal,26 although, as stated, such prosecutions are unheard of in Hong 
Kong courts.  Every year about 12,000 unwanted dogs are euthanized 
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by the AFCD in the Territory. 27  Whilst officially the policy of the 
AFCD is to allow abandoned animals to be adopted the public has no 
access to the animal holding facilities and unless one of the charity 
organizations seeking to rescue animals in Hong Kong can find a place 
for the animal, it can be euthanized within 4 days. 28  This rule, enacted 
under the Pounds Ordinance, ensures that many owned animals that 
have gone astray are killed before their owners can locate and reclaim 
them. More than 95% of dogs which enter an AFCD animal 
management facility will be euthansased.  AFCD has reported that 
between 2002 and 2007, 3,643 dogs and 605 cats were re-homed 
through their management centres whilst 65,304 dogs and 27,117 cats 
were destroyed, many for population control purposes. 29  
 
In a bid to humanely control the feral/stray dog population in Hong 
Kong, the government has considered, but has yet to implement, a Trap 
Neuter Return (TNR) program for feral dogs.  Hong Kong, like much of 
Asia, has a large number of unowned dogs living around country parks, 
villages in outlying areas, construction sites and wandering the city.  It 
would benefit from the introduction of a vaccination and neuter 
program. These dogs live semi independently of people, receiving only 
intermittent feeding, at best.  They are usually unvaccinated and very 
rarely neutered.  They and their offspring are large contributors to the 
unwanted dog population in Hong Kong.   
 
The SPCA coordinates 595 cat colony programs across Hong Kong, 
involving 450 registered carers30.  Trained volunteers humanely trap 
street cats and transport them to the SPCA for de-sexing and general 
medical treatment.  Friendly cats are placed in the SPCA’s adoption 
program.  Cats found unsuitable for domestication are returned to their 
original colonies.  Volunteers continue to oversee the welfare of those 
cats returned to the street, providing regular food, water and health 
monitoring.  With this experience the charity has offered to assist the 
government in implementing a TNR program for dogs.  The number of 
dogs awaiting adoption in Hong Kong has long ago reached breaking 
point so in this case, where the dogs are found to be healthy and 
unaggressive, the program would allow the vaccinated and neutered 
dogs to be returned to the area in which they were caught, thus 
controlling the population.  However, to date government has refused to 
accept the SPCA’s offer to trap, neuter and release the dogs, insisting 
that if they implement the program the government will hold the SPCA 
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responsible for the dogs, at law, with the attached liability for their 
subsequent behaviour, a responsibility no reasonable NGO can accept.   
 
The controversy stems from an interpretation of section 2 of the Rabies 
Ordinance, Cap 421, which defines the ‘keeper’ of an animal as a 
person who owns the animal, or has it in his possession or custody, or 
who harbors the animal.  The government view is that by performing 
vaccination and micro chipping procedures on a feral dog, the SPCA 
will become the animal’s legal keeper.  It is important to note however 
that the definition of ‘keeper’ under the law specifically excludes any 
person who has possession or custody of the animal for the purpose of 
examining or vaccinating it.31  Only an authorized person may vaccinate 
an animal against rabies,32and as evidence of such vaccination, tattoo 
the ear, tag the collar or microchip the animal.33  Only then can the dog 
be licenced.  The government appears to have confused the requirement 
that only vaccinated dogs can be micro chipped and licensed with a 
legal duty to seek a licence on every vaccination.  No licence may be 
granted for a dog unless it has been vaccinated against rabies within the 
previous 3 years.34  However, to obtain a valid keeper’s licence, 
vaccination must be proven.  A person requesting a dog licence must 
apply for the licence from AFCD, prove the animal has been vaccinated, 
by having its micro chip number read and pay a prescribed fee. 35  Only 
then does he become the “keeper” of the animal.   
 
The Ordinance specifically exempts vets who perform vaccinations on 
animals from becoming “keepers” in order to ensure that unnecessary 
liability is not thereby incurred in veterinary practice. 36  Although it is 
possible for a person in practice to become the ‘keeper’ of an animal, 
without having taken any steps to secure a valid licence,37 the law 
clearly does not intend for those who perform medical procedures on 
animals to be indirectly liable for that animal for ever after.  As such the 
government’s refusal to accept the SPCA’s offer to implement a TNR 
program for feral dogs in Hong Kong is, at the least, misguided and 
perhaps disingenuous.  In taking such a position government has 
effectively blocked the implementation of the Trap Neuter Release 
program for feral dogs in Hong Kong, a program that would make a 
significant contribution to animal welfare in the Territory.   
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Whilst it is possible this uncooperative attitude results from poor legal 
advice it appears more likely that AFCD administrative considerations 
(fear of having to deal with nuisance complaints) are the real reason no 
effective action has been taken on this matter in over a decade.   
 
Reform 
 
Whilst public outcry at the low levels of penalties imposed for 
companion animal cruelty cases has led to an increase in the highest 
sentence which may be passed under Cap 169, the definition of cruelty 
has yet to be adequately addressed in Hong Kong.  Whilst in 
jurisdictions such as New Zealand38 and Australia,39 minimum standards 
of care, and duties of ownership, for companion animals are set, such 
standards are not yet a part of Hong Kong law.  Detailed provision for 
appropriate space, food and exercise are routinely included in 
legislation in other common law jurisdictions but not in Hong Kong.  
Failure to provide clean water or suitable shelter for an animal are 
common offences in Hong Kong, where adequate public education is 
lacking.  Unfortunately, such criminal negligence is currently 
punishable only by a fine and cannot be prosecuted as an act of cruelty 
under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Ordinance, unless the court 
is able to be satisfied, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the animal has 
suffered unnecessarily.40  While Hong Kong continues to provide no 
minimum welfare standards for animals, its laws remain outdated and 
out of step with much of the world.   
 
Of course the animal welfare laws in jurisdictions such as Australia and 
New Zealand are not without fault.  In these jurisdictions the 
introduction of minimum standards in animal husbandry has often acted 
to the detriment of the animals rather than to their benefit.  In Australia 
compliance with an industry code, setting minimum standards of care 
for certain types of farm animal, often provides a defence to a cruelty 
prosecution.41  In New Zealand, the introduction of a duty of care, 
(based on the UK model providing the animal with the right to have its 
core needs met), has also failed to protect farm animals.  The Animal 
Welfare Act provides that it is a defence to liability for failing to provide 
the animal with its core needs if it can be shown that the defendant was 
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in compliance with an established industry code. 42  Codes can thus be 
used to effectively undermine the higher standards set by the legislation.  
Legislative reformists in Hong Kong should stay mindful of these 
deficiencies and ensure the same mistakes are not repeated here.   
 
Hong Kong’s animal welfare laws were drafted in the 1930’s and the 
need for change has been recognized.  The Hong Kong government has 
recently proposed amendments to the legislation to better promote 
animal welfare.43  The proposals include allowing a new order to be 
made on conviction which would prohibit persons who have been 
convicted of cruelty offences from keeping animals.  The government 
also intends to provide powers to government vets to require owners to 
act immediately to rectify welfare problems.  Pet traders will soon be 
more restricted in their sourcing of dogs, in some cases curtailing the 
use of unlicensed breeders.  Fines for selling unweaned animals will be 
doubled, to $100,000, and trade licences will be revocable at the 
discretion of the AFCD.   
 
However, the proposed amendments simply do not go far enough.  
Hong Kong’s legislation must be fundamentally re-drafted to recognise 
the serious responsibilities which attach to animal ownership and make 
those who own animals criminally responsible not just for obvious acts 
of cruelty but for failure to provide adequate care to their animals.  The 
current animal welfare laws of Hong Kong are lagging woefully behind 
most civilized jurisdictions.  The amendments currently being proposed 
by government will not significantly address this gap.   
 
Hong Kong needs to review overseas practice and reform its animal 
welfare model from the current reactive version to a more active 
framework.  Current legislation does little more than set out some broad 
and often unenforceable prohibitions.  Rather, the law should provide 
that a person commits an offence if he does not take such steps as are 
reasonable in all the circumstances to ensure that the needs of the 
animal for which he is responsible are met to the extent required by 
good practice.44  Specific cruel and harmful practices compromising 
animal welfare must be adequately identified and penalized under the 
law.  Changes to the current law are required in four key areas.   
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1.  Minimum Standards of Care 
 
The obligations that owners of animals and those in charge of animals 
owe must be clearly defined in the Ordinance and enforced.  Those in 
charge of animals must be required to provide minimum standards of 
care which are detailed within the law.  These should include requiring 
those in charge of animals to provide, at all times, proper food and 
water, a suitable environment with adequate shelter, protection from 
pain and suffering and treatment of injury and disease, recognition of 
any need to be housed with, or apart from, other animals and adequate 
opportunity to exhibit normal behaviour. 45   
 
Where these minimum standards of care are breached then, prima facie, 
an offence should be deemed to have been committed under the 
legislation.  Where the potential for a breach of the minimum standards 
seems likely, owners should be educated to rectify the problem, through 
the service of improvement notices, a common practice in the UK.  
Prosecutions should be pursued against owners who refuse to comply 
with improvement notices and therefore act in breach of the legislation.   
 
2.  Pro-Active Prosecution 
 
A more pro-active approach must be taken against those who breach 
minimum welfare standards, with a focus on government pursuing 
enforcement, education and prosecutions.  SPCA inspectors should be 
appointed, where appropriate, to act as animal welfare investigators 
with powers of entry, search and seizure. 46  There would be no conflict 
of interest arising through the SPCA gathering evidence at the 
investigatory stage as the Hong Kong SPCA does not prosecute animal 
cruelty cases.  Hong Kong AFCD inspectors react to nuisance 
complaints which relate to animals but do not have the funding, 
manpower nor expertise to concern themselves with the welfare of 
animals.  SPCA inspectors, who have received appropriate training in 
law enforcement, should be appointed to act as animal welfare 
investigators alongside AFCD staff, with the specific task of promoting 
animal welfare.  Such officers could also ensure that cases are properly 
investigated and the best evidence gathered for referral to the 
Department of Justice.   
 
Current law only allows orders for the removal of the animal to be made 
post conviction.  But, courts should be permitted to order the disposal, 
sale, transferral of ownership or destruction of animals whenever such 
                                                
45 See by way of example section 9(2) Animal Welfare Act 2006 (UK) 
46 See by way of example section 28 Animal Welfare Act 1985 (South Australia). 
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interim orders are deemed necessary to protect the welfare of the 
animals concerned.  Guidelines should be provided in the legislation as 
to when such orders should be made.   
 
Cap 169 currently permits an animal abuser to require the destruction of 
his property, a viable animal, to avoid the costs of maintaining its life.  
There is a government proposal to replace this power with a more 
limited right which would allow the offender to avoid maintenance 
expenses by surrendering ownership of the animal to government, but 
not to require its destruction.   
 
3.  Adequate Investigative Powers 
 
Animal welfare investigators must be provided with increased entry, 
search and seizure powers.  Where a breach of minimum standards is 
reasonably suspected, animal welfare investigators should be permitted 
to step in, before any decision to prosecute is taken, to provide 
protection for animals whose welfare may be compromised by the 
breach.  It should not be the case that an animal must actually have 
suffered harm before steps can be taken to protect the animal’s welfare.  
In emergency situations animal welfare investigation officers should be 
permitted to enter private premises for the purpose of pursing their 
duties under the law. 47 
 
In cases of emergency involving significant suffering, the law must 
permit animal welfare investigators or veterinary surgeons to euthanize 
an animal, without the consent of the owner, despite the abrogation of 
his common law rights. 48 
 
4.  Appropriate Penalties 
 
Penalties provided under the legislation must demonstrate that crimes 
against animals are taken seriously.  Legislation should provide not only 
specific penalties but also sentencing principles or guidelines for judges 
to observe in passing sentence on animal welfare offenders.49  Ancillary 
sentencing powers should include the power to disqualify an offender 
from owning or being in charge of animals, participating in keeping 
animals, or from being party to any arrangement under which he is 
entitled to control or influence the way in which animals are kept, either 
                                                
47 See section 30 Animal Welfare Act 1985 (South Australia). 
48 See section 18(3) and (4) Animal Welfare Act 2006 (UK). 
49 See, by way of example, Magistrates Court Sentencing Guidelines for Animal Cruelty, Sentencing Guidelines Council, UK, 
effective from 4 August 2008. 
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permanently or for a specified period. 50  Courts should also have power 
to cancel or suspend licences and to forfeit equipment used in the 
commission of offences.51  Expenses involved in caring for those 
animals which have been subjected to offences should be recoverable as 
costs in proceedings. 52 
 
Conclusion 
 
The most significant problem with the current legislation, however, is 
the inability and reluctance of the primary government body charged 
with its enforcement to adequately address animal welfare issues.  The 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation, in its current 
state, is an inappropriate choice as safeguard for animal welfare.  The 
AFCD has a long history of treating feral animals as a source of public 
nuisance which must be eradicated.  Where the public complains of 
feral dog noise or faeces, the dogs are rounded up and killed.  Where the 
public sights feral pigs living in rural areas AFCD licensed hunting 
teams are sent out to track and shoot them.  Even when dealing with 
such relatively straight forward matters as licensing the pet trade, the 
AFCD seems reluctant to make animal welfare a priority.  AFCD 
committees have allowed the economic interests of those in the pet 
industry to take precedence over any serious attempt to overhaul 
breeding regulations for companion animals.   
 
Welfare considerations play a lowly role in the AFCD’s strategies for 
animal management.  If animals are to be protected truly in Hong Kong, 
this most fundamental of problems must be directly addressed.   
_____________________ 
 
 
                                                
50 See section 34 Animal Welfare Act 2006 (UK). 
51 See section 40 Animal Welfare Act 2006 (UK). 
52 See section 18(13) and section 39 Animal Welfare Act 2006 (UK). 
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BOOK REVIEWS 
 
Handbook of Australian Animal Cruelty Law 
Malcolm Caulfield 
Publisher: Animals Australia 
ISBN 978-0-646-50545-9 
 
 
With the first laws preventing cruelty to animals in Australia enacted 
150 years or so ago, it is surprising that it has taken so long for the first 
book on the matter to be published. Then again, the delay in developing 
a legal interest in this area simply reflects the lack of desire by the 
general community to ensure that the laws actually deliver on their 
promise. The author makes it abundantly clear throughout his book that 
the current laws and their enforcement mechanisms do little to 
effectively protect animals from cruelty, particularly in the agribusiness 
sector, and that they are able to prevent only the most heinous actions 
against animals.  In essence the laws are there to enshrine common 
practices and provide immunity to those who conduct them - arguably, 
they benefit humans as much as, if not more so than, the animals.  It is 
no wonder then that the author refers to such laws in the book title as 
cruelty, rather than anti-cruelty, laws and that he describes the field as 'a 
muddled mess of second hand law, poor and amateurish enforcement 
and a cynical failure by governments and public servants to grasp the 
nettle of large scale animal cruelty in agribusiness'. 
 
The Handbook presents together information from the nine Australian 
jurisdictions. The information is meticulously researched and 
referenced.  Australian cruelty cases, as well as offences and adoption 
of codes of practice in the various jurisdictions are conveniently 
tabulated.  Hence the Handbook will be a marvellous resource for 
anyone interested in Australian animal cruelty laws, including legal 
practitioners and animal activists, particularly those with some legal 
training. 
 
The first three chapters examine historical developments as well as 
general definitions, principles and instruments of cruelty law.  These are 
particularly useful to put the following chapters in context.   
 
Chapters four, five and six focus on three areas with high levels of 
cruelty: live export; authorized killing of farm and wild animals; and 
use of animals for research and teaching.   
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Chapter seven is a damning indictment of the current enforcement 
mechanisms for cruelty laws in Australia.   
 
Chapter eight features some interesting case studies.  The author's deep 
understanding of the legal and political background of these cases, in 
part owing to his close involvement with some of the legal proceedings, 
makes the reading riveting.  One could almost think the case studies 
were invented to illustrate the many deficiencies of the law…. 
 
The author is at his best when he critically comments on the various 
aspects of the laws and identifies their deficiencies (and he has plenty to 
choose from).  His comments are incisive and his suggestions for 
reform powerfully convincing.  Most chapters are split in two sections: 
'summary and overview' and 'the law in detail'.  The detailed parts 
provide a thorough, and dense at time, description of the laws as they 
apply in all jurisdictions. Although the inadequacy of these laws is 
obvious to experienced animal lawyers, this may not be so for 
inexperienced readers.  Thus Chapters five and six would benefit from 
additional commentary, critique and specially concluding remarks, 
highlighting the salient features, gaps or suggested reform.  Naturally 
such comments would inevitably cover the same ground: the laws lack 
consistency across borders, are full of exclusions and exemptions, and 
desperately need reform if they are to meaningfully protect animals 
from cruelty.  
 
The writing style is sophisticated yet easy to read.  Some typographical 
errors (particularly what appears to be missing spaces between words) 
are minor for a production of this sort. 
 
The Handbook may help herald a new era of increased awareness of 
animal law in Australia. It should be compulsory reading for those who 
naïvely think that animals are well protected in Australia.  Thanks to the 
generosity of its sponsors, students and others with an interest in animal 
law can obtain a copy free by emailing sarah@animalsaustralia.org.  
 
– Dominique Thiriet, School of Law, James Cook University 
 
_____________________ 
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Animal Law In Australasia - A new dialogue 
Edited by Peter Sankoff & Steven White  
Publisher Federation Press 
ISBN 9781862877191 
 
 
“This is a book of scholarship, but it’s also a book of much more,” as 
the Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG said at the May 2009 launch.  “It’s a 
book of empirical facts, which buzz around in the brain and which are 
facts that I don’t believe most Australians know of, and they should 
know of.” 
 
“The book deals with the theoretical questions that lie at the heart of 
changing legal attitudes,” Mr Kirby, a former High Court justice, said.  
“How one changes those attitudes and then changes law, or changes law 
and stimulates changes of attitudes - which is what happened with the 
rights of the Aboriginal people to their land - is a question which isn’t 
ultimately resolved in the book, but it certainly is presented in the 
chapters for our consideration.” 
 
Note:   A “review copy” of this important publication was not received before 
deadline.  A full review will appear in the next issue of the AAPLJ -  JM. 
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Australia’s first peer-reviewed 
animal law journal 
 
 
The Australian Animal Protection Law Journal (AAPLJ) is 
intended to be a vehicle for principled consideration and spirited 
discussion of the issues of law and fact affecting the lives of non-
human animals.   
 
The greatest threat to animals is passivity and ongoing 
acceptance of the status quo; a status quo most easily maintained 
through silence.   
 
Concise letters in reply to any of the articles published are 
always welcomed.  
 
The AAPLJ logo was drawn by Christine Townend who, in 
1976, convened the first meeting of Animal Liberation 
(Australia).  -  JM.   
 
 
 
Guidelines for Contributors 
 
All contributions (apart from brief case notes, letters and book 
reviews) are subject to peer review.  Reviewers are not made 
aware of the contributing authors’ identities and the reviewers 
remain anonymous to all but the Editor.   
 
Articles must be original and should be accurate as to matters 
of fact and law.  They may be generally informative or they may 
take a critical or analytical perspective.  The best guide to the 
style is to closely read articles as published in the AAPLJ.  Of 
course, contributors should write in plain English.   
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There is no recommended length of articles, but if they exceed 
about 6,000 words referees may consider whether the article is 
worthy of publication regardless of the length, or whether it could 
be shortened.  Case notes, if they are simply reportage, should be 
concisely stated.  Articles/briefs which take a critical or analytical 
perspective on interesting cases are particularly welcome.   
 
The AAPLJ style generally follows The Australian Guide to 
Legal Citation (see http://mulr.law.  unimelb.edu.au/aglc.asp).   
 
All material submitted should be marked "Attn: AAPLJ 
Editor" and may be emailed to mancyj@gmail.com, preferably in 
MS Word or Rich Text Format (RFT).   
 
In 2009, issues of the Australian Protection Law Journal will 
be published in June and December.   
 
_____________________ 
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